Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A Socio-economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gerard Marty

    ()
    (Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière, INRA - AgroParisTech)

  • Raphaele Preget

    ()
    (Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière, INRA - AgroParisTech)

Abstract

This socio-economic study aims to better understand the functioning and the evolution of timber sales held by the French public forest service. The auction mechanism is the historical institution which has been used in France for centuries. The recent will to develop supply contracts through private agreements is a major change in the French timber industry. It accurately raises questions about the timber prices issue.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nancy.inra.fr/lef/content/download/2911/28870/version/1/file/doc_LEF_n2007-03.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found (http://www.nancy.inra.fr/lef/content/download/2911/28870/version/1/file/doc_LEF_n2007-03.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://www6.nancy.inra.fr/lef/content/download/2911/28870/version/1/file/doc_LEF_n2007-03.pdf). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Benoit Vandenbroucke)
File Function: First version, 2007
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA in its series Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF with number 2007-03.

as in new window
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lef:wpaper:2007-03

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 14 rue Girardet, 54042 Nancy cedex
Phone: 33 (0)3 83 39 68 66
Fax: 33 (0)3 83 37 06 45
Email:
Web page: http://www.nancy.inra.fr/lef
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Timber sales; timber auctions; timber prices; French public forests; French wood industry; institution;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Hansen, Robert G, 1985. "Empirical Testing of Auction Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 156-59, May.
  2. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Economics Papers 2004-W09, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  3. Raphaële Préget & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2006. "Un modèle d'estimation de la valeur des lots de bois à partir de résultats d'enchères avec invendus," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 593-603.
  4. Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997. "Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 657-99, August.
  5. Vijay Krishna & Robert Rosenthal, 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Papers 0056, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  6. Eric S. Maskin & John G. Riley, 1985. "Auction Theory with Private Values," UCLA Economics Working Papers 359, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Barzel, Yoram, 1982. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 27-48, April.
  8. Branco, Fernando, 1997. "Sequential auctions with synergies: An example," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 159-163, February.
  9. Bernard ELYAKIME & Jean-Jacques LAFFONT & Patrice LOISEL & Quang VUONG, 1994. "First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 34, pages 115-141.
  10. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
  11. Bernhardt, Dan & Scoones, David, 1993. "A Note on Sequential Auctions," Working Papers 829, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  12. Philip A. Haile & Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2004. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Working Papers 2004.149, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  13. Lusht, Kenneth M, 1994. "Order and Price in a Sequential Auction," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 259-66, May.
  14. Philip A. Haile, 2001. "Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 399-427, June.
  15. Jeitschko, Thomas D., 1999. "Equilibrium price paths in sequential auctions with stochastic supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-72, July.
  16. Jonathan Levin & Susan Athey & Enrique Seira, 2004. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions," Working Papers 2004.142, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  17. Paarsch, H.J., 1992. "Empirical Models of Auctions and an Application to British Columbian Timber Sales," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9212, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  18. Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Flavio Menezes, 1999. "Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions," Microeconomics 9901002, EconWPA, revised 03 Feb 1999.
  19. Mark Granovetter, 2005. "The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 33-50, Winter.
  20. Ashenfelter, Orley & Genesove, David, 1992. "Testing for Price Anomalies in Real-Estate Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 501-05, May.
  21. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H & Wilson, Charles A, 1994. "Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1415-44, November.
  22. Paarsch, Harry J., 1997. "Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 333-357, June.
  23. Etzioni, Amitai, 1986. "The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(02), pages 159-184, October.
  24. Gandal, Neil, 1997. "Sequential Auctions of Interdependent Objects: Israeli Cable Television Licenses," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 227-44, September.
  25. McAfee, R. Preston & Vincent, Daniel, 1997. "Sequentially Optimal Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 246-276, February.
  26. McAfee, R Preston & Vincent, Daniel, 1992. "Updating the Reserve Price in Common-Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 512-18, May.
  27. Vincent Daniel R., 1995. "Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 575-584, April.
  28. Vanderporten, Bruce, 1992. "Timing of Bids at Pooled Real Estate Auctions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 255-67, September.
  29. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
  30. Brannman, Lance Eric, 1996. "Potential Competition and Possible Collusion in Forest Service Timber Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 730-45, October.
  31. Black, Jane & De Meza, David, 1992. "Systematic Price Differences between Successive Auctions Are No Anomaly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(4), pages 607-28, Winter.
  32. von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik Morch, 1994. "Predatory Bidding in Sequential Auctions," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 345-56, July.
  33. Gale Ian L. & Hausch Donald B., 1994. "Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 318-331, November.
  34. Donald B. Hausch, 1986. "Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(12), pages 1599-1610, December.
  35. Bajari, Patrick & Hortacsu, Ali, 2003. " The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 329-55, Summer.
  36. repec:att:wimass:9215 is not listed on IDEAS
  37. Tong Li & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Timber Sale Auctions with Random Reserve Prices," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 189-200, February.
  38. Hansen, Robert G, 1986. "Sealed-Bid versus Open Auctions: The Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(1), pages 125-42, January.
  39. Caillaud, Bernard & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2004. "Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 78-95, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lef:wpaper:2007-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Benoit Vandenbroucke).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.