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Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

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Author Info
Philip A. Haile (Yale University)
Han Hong (Duke University)
Matthew Shum (Johns Hopkins University)

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Abstract

We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the “winner’s curse” arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed methods for using observed bids to estimate each bidder’s conditional expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations are invariant to the number of opponents each bidder faces, while with common values they are decreasing in the number of opponents. This distinction forms the basis of our tests. We consider both exogenous and endogenous variation in the number of bidders. Monte Carlo experiments show that our tests can perform well in samples of moderate sizes. We apply our tests to two different types of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. For unit-price (“scaled”) sales often argued to fit a private values model, our tests consistently fail to find evidence of common values. For “lumpsum” sales, where a priori arguments for common values appear stronger, our tests yield mixed evidence against the private values hypothesis.

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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2004.149.

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Date of creation: Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.149

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Related research
Keywords: First-price auctions; Common values; Private values; Nonparametric testing; Winner’s curse; Stochastic dominance; Endogenous participation; Timber auctions;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Wolak, Frank A, 1991. "The Local Nature of Hypothesis Tests Involving Inequality Constraints in Nonlinear Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 981-95, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sudip Gupta, 2004. "Endogenous Asymmetry and Entry in Sequential Multi-Unit Auctions: Identification and Estimation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 566, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. Saul Lach & José Luis Moraga-González, 2009. "Asymmetric Price Effects of Competition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-049/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Platform for Auction Simulations," Department Discussion Papers 0706, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gerard Marty & Raphaele Preget, 2007. "A Socio-economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2007-03, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Tong Li & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2006. "Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions," CeMMAP working papers CWP13/06, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  6. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2009. "Multiagent System Simulations of Signal Averaging in English Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 119-143, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nuno Cassola & Christian Ewerhart & Claudio Morana, 2007. "Structural econometric approach to bidding in the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem," Working Paper Series 793, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Susan Athey, 2005. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000098, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE Working Papers 2008-64, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Matthijs R Wildenbeest, 2009. "An Empirical Model of Search with Vertically Differentiated Products," Working Papers 2009-01, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  11. Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2008. "Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions," Micro Theory Working Papers marmer-08-01-17-12-16-12, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 27 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Athias, Laure & Nunez, Antonio, 2008. "The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions," MPRA Paper 10539, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  13. Jonathan Levin & Susan Athey & Enrique Seira, 2004. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions," Working Papers 2004.142, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Xun Tang, 2008. "Bounds on Revenue Distributions in Counterfactual Auctions with Reserve Prices," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-042, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  15. Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pai, 2007. "What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach," Micro Theory Working Papers marmer-07-11-22-02-26-44, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 22 Nov 2007. [Downloadable!]
  16. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Simulations of Sealed-Bid Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals," Department Discussion Papers 0707, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
  17. Philippe Février, 2008. "Nonparametric identification and estimation of a class of common value auction models," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 949-964. [Downloadable!]
  18. Horowitz, John K. & Lynch, Lori & Stocking, Andrew, 2007. "Competition-Based Environmental Policy: An Analysis of Farmland Preservation in Maryland," Working Papers 7340, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001045, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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