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Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions

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Author Info
Caillaud, Bernard
Mezzetti, Claudio

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4BMC55Y-1/2/d3628b3581432aeb9979183676d16b59
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 117 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 78-95
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:117:y:2004:i:1:p:78-95

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Gerard Marty & Raphaele Preget, 2007. "A Socio-economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2007-03, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Johannes Horner & Julian Jamison, 2006. "Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 1422, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment," Working Papers 08-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sun, Ching-jen, 2007. "A Note on the Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper 9813, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Robert Zeithammer, 2009. "Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 187-216, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Oct 2008. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.


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