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Online Auctions

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  • Axel Ockenfels
  • David Reiley
  • Abdolkarim Sadrieh

Abstract

The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12785.

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Date of creation: Dec 2006
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12785

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