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Collusion and the Choice of Auction

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Author Info
Marc S. Robinson
Abstract

Auctions are used in many different markets, including the leasing of a substantial fraction of the natural resources in the United States. The procedures used in the auctions conducted by the federal government have been a continuing source of controversy. One of the concerns has been the possibility of collusion among bidders. This article shows that cartels are stable if the seller uses open ascending-bid (oral) auctions, but not if he uses sealed high-bid auctions. This may help to explain the frequent use of sealed high-bid auctions.

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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28198521%2916%3A1%3C141%3ACATCOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H&origin=repec
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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 16 (1985)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 141-145
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:spring:p:141-145

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  1. Dietrich Franz & List Christian, 2006. "Judgment aggregation on restricted domains," Research Memoranda 033, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. Allan Ingraham, 2005. "A Test for Collusion between a Bidder and an Auctioneer in Sealed-Bid Auctions," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1448-1448. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Patrick Bajari & Garrett Summers, . "Detecting Collusion in Procurement Auctions: A Selective Survey of Recent Research," Working Papers 01014, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. David McAdams & Michael Schwarz, 2007. "Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 260-276, March.
  6. Kenneth Hendricks & Robert Porter, 1989. "Collusion in Auctions," Discussion Papers 817, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  7. Elmar WOLFSTETTER, . "Auctions-An Introduction," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1994-13, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
    Other versions:
  8. Leslie M. Marx & Robert C. Marshall, 2004. "Bidder Collusion," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 108, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  9. Li, Jin & Plott, Charles R., 2005. "Tacit collusion in auctions and conditions for its facilitation and prevention: Equilibrium selection in laboratory experimental markets," Working Papers 1223, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  10. B. Jacobsen, 1999. "Auctions Without Competition: The Case of Timber Sales in the Murmansk Region," Working Papers ir99072, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  11. Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  12. Hongjun Zhong, 2002. "postbid market interaction and auction choice," Microeconomics 0210002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  13. Kwasnica, Anthony M., 1998. "Collusion in Multiple Object Simultaneous Auctions: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers 1010, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  14. Saphores, Jean-Daniel & Vincent, Jeffrey R. & Marochko, Valy & Abrudan, Ioan & Bouriaud, Laura & Zinnes, Clifford, 2006. "Detecting collusion in timber auctions : an application to Romania," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4105, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  15. Matthew J. Clayton & S. Abraham Ravid, 1999. "The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-055, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]
  16. Albert Choi, 2004. "A Rent Extraction Theory of Right of First Refusal," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 759, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  17. Xinyu Hua, 2004. "Strategic Ex-ante Contracts: Rent-Extraction and Opportunity Costs," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 564, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  18. Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Paul Pezanis-Christou & Bettina Rockenbach & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Reinhard Selten, 2001. "An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for the British 3G / UMTS Auction," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse25_2001, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Gino Loyola, 2008. "On bidding markets: the role of competition," Economics Working Papers we083318, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  20. Giuseppe Lopomo & Robert Marshall & Leslie Marx, 2005. "Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1156-1156. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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