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Collusion and the Choice of Auction

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  • Marc S. Robinson
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    Abstract

    Auctions are used in many different markets, including the leasing of a substantial fraction of the natural resources in the United States. The procedures used in the auctions conducted by the federal government have been a continuing source of controversy. One of the concerns has been the possibility of collusion among bidders. This article shows that cartels are stable if the seller uses open ascending-bid (oral) auctions, but not if he uses sealed high-bid auctions. This may help to explain the frequent use of sealed high-bid auctions.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 16 (1985)
    Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
    Pages: 141-145

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    Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:spring:p:141-145

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    Cited by:
    1. Walter Orellana Rocha & Bernardo X. Fernández Tellería & Vladimir Fernández Quiroga, 2006. "Subasta electrónica interactiva y subasta a sobre cerrado: Un análisis comparativo de los resultados en Bolivia," Revista de Análisis del BCB, Banco Central de Bolivia, Banco Central de Bolivia, vol. 9(1), pages 65-113, December.
    2. Martin Bichler & Alexander Pikovsky & Thomas Setzer, 2009. "An Analysis of Design Problems in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions," Business & Information Systems Engineering, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 111-117, February.
    3. Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration, University of Munich, Munich School of Management 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
    4. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7238 edited by Forges, Françoise.
    5. Ettinger, David, 2008. "Auctions and shareholdings," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/5431, Paris Dauphine University.
    6. David McAdams & Michael Schwarz, 2007. "Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 260-276, March.
    7. Rodolfo Guerrero & José Luis Negrín, 2006. "Eficiencia del sistema bancario mexicano 1997-2004: una estimación dinámica," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(3), pages 235-259, julio-sep.
    8. Leslie M. Marx & Robert C. Marshall, 2004. "Bidder Collusion," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings, Econometric Society 108, Econometric Society.
    9. Omer Biran, 2013. "Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 117-136, July.
    10. Paul Castillo & Carlos Montoro & Vicente Tuesta, 2006. "Estimación de la tasa natural de interés para la economía peruana," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(3), pages 261-298, julio-sep.
    11. Kang, Chao-Chung & Lee, Tsun-Siou & Huang, Szu-Chi, 2013. "Royalty bargaining in Public–Private Partnership projects: Insights from a theoretic three-stage game auction model," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 1-14.
    12. Heide Coenen & Manfred J. Holler & Esko Niskanen, 2000. "5th Helsinki Workshop on Standardization and Networks, 13-14 August, 2000," Discussion Papers, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT) 243, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
    13. Xinyu Hua, 2004. "Strategic Ex-ante Contracts: Rent-Extraction and Opportunity Costs," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings, Econometric Society 564, Econometric Society.
    14. Greve,T. & Pollitt, M. G., 2012. "Designing electiricty transmission auctions: an introduction to the relevant literature," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 1245, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

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