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Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères

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  • Jean-Jacques Laffont

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[eng] Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data by Jean- Jacques Laffont . The paper is a survey of applied work with auction data. We review the main distribution free predictions of the three major game theoretic models, the identification of their stochastic structure, and their confrontation with data. We study successively, the symmetric common value model, the independent private values model, and the asymmetric value model. Conditional upon being in one of these models, game theoretic restrictions can be tested. . A major conclusion is that predictions are highly dependent on the unobservable restrictions on the distributions of charactristics. The paper concludes with a suggestion to develop structural econometrics of auction data with only a few restrictions on these distributions. [fre] Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères . par Jean- Jacques Laffont . Le présent article consiste en une revue des travaux appliqués sur données issues d'enchères. Nous passons en revue les principales prédictions des trois modèles de référence d'enchères, indépendamment des fonctions de répartition théoriques. Nous identifions leur structure stochastique et la pertinence de leur confrontation aux données réelles. Nous étudions ainsi successivement le modèle à valeur commune symétrique, le modèle à valeurs privées indépendantes et le modèle à valeur commune asymétrique. Pour chacun de ces modèles, il est possible de tester les restrictions imposées par la théorie des jeux. . Une importante conclusion est que les prédictions sont fortement dépendantes des restrictions inobservables imposées aux fonctions de répartition des caractéristiques. Nous concluons l'article en suggérant de développer une économétrie structurelle des données en ne posant que quelques restrictions sur ces fonctions de répartition.

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  • Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1998. "Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 121-137.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5904
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1998.5904
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1998.5904
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