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Sequential Auctions of Endogenously Valued Objects

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  • Gale, Ian L.
  • Stegeman, Mark
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-458NM5P-23/2/987e6022ac692f99b6e53a4c91bdb482
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 36 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 1 (July)
    Pages: 74-103

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:36:y:2001:i:1:p:74-103

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Kala Krishna, 1999. "Auctions with endogenous valuations: the snowball effect revisited," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 377-391.
    2. Budd, Christopher & Harris, Christopher & Vickers, John, 1993. "A Model of the Evolution of Duopoly: Does the Asymmetry between Firms Tend to Increase or Decrease?," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 543-73, July.
    3. Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991. "Naked Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1137-45, December.
    4. Harris, Christopher & Vickers, John, 1985. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 193-209, April.
    5. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
    6. Dudey, Marc, 1992. "Dynamic Edgeworth-Bertrand Competition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(4), pages 1461-77, November.
    7. McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June.
    8. Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-31, June.
    9. Black, Jane & De Meza, David, 1992. "Systematic Price Differences between Successive Auctions Are No Anomaly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(4), pages 607-28, Winter.
    10. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-26, June.
    11. Vickers, John S, 1986. "The Evolution of Market Structure When There Is a Sequence of Innovations," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 1-12, September.
    12. von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik Morch, 1994. "Predatory Bidding in Sequential Auctions," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 345-56, July.
    13. Krishna, K., 1990. "Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: The Persistence of Monopoly Revisited," Papers 472, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Carolyn Pitchik, 1989. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions With Incomplete Information," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 201, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    2. Bruno Larue & Mohamed Jeddy & S├ębastien Pouliot, 2013. "On the Number of Bidders and Auction Performance: when More Means Less," Cahiers de recherche CREATE 2013-4, CREATE.
    3. Jeddy, Mohamed & Larue, Bruno, 2012. "Mergers, concurrent marketing mechanisms and the performance of sequential auctions," Working Papers 126945, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
    4. Mezzetti, Claudio, 2008. "Aversion to Price Risk and the Afternoon Effect," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 857, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:429-436 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Caillaud, Bernard & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2004. "Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 78-95, July.

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