Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study
AbstractThis article presents an experimental study of bidding behavior in sequential auctions in which there are budget constraints and perfect information. Our experiments test both the properties of such auctions and the predictive power of a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. We find that budget constraints affect the behavior of bidders and that the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is generally a good predictor of prices.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 19 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
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Other versions of this item:
- Pitchik, Carolyn & Schotter, Andrew, 1986. "Perfect Equilibria in Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 86-22, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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