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Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study

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Carolyn Pitchik
Andrew Schotter

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Abstract

This article presents an experimental study of bidding behavior in sequential auctions in which there are budget constraints and perfect information. Our experiments test both the properties of such auctions and the predictive power of a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. We find that budget constraints affect the behavior of bidders and that the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is generally a good predictor of prices.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 19 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 363-388
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:autumn:p:363-388

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  1. Banks, Jeffrey & Camerer, Colin & Porter, David., 1990. "An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games," Working Papers 740, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Partow, Z. & Schotter, A., 1993. "Does Game Theory Predict Well for the Wrong Reasons: An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 93-46, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1994. "Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result," Working Paper 9402, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  4. Peter Cramton, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 95jems, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1998. "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Game Theory and Information 9805001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jul 1999. [Downloadable!]
  6. Tibor Neugebauer & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2003. "Bidding at Sequential First-Price Auctions with(out) Supply Uncertainty: A Laboratory Analysis," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 558.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  7. Paul Milgrom, . "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Working Papers 98002, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Heide Coenen & Manfred J. Holler & Esko Niskanen, 2000. "5th Helsinki Workshop on Standardization and Networks, 13-14 August, 2000," Discussion Papers 243, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT). [Downloadable!]
  9. Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997. "Auctions of Licences and Market Structure," Economics Working Papers 209, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  10. Tibor Neugebauer, 2005. "Bidding Strategies Of Sequential First Price Auctions Programmed By Experienced Bidders," Experimental 0503007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Masili, Gustavo, 2006. "Auction with aftermarket for budget constrained bidders," MPRA Paper 2134, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  12. Carolyn Pitchik, 2006. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information," Working Papers tecipa-230, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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