This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Marco Battaglini (Princeton University)
Rebecca Morton (New York University)
Thomas Palfrey (Princeton University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We compare the behavior of voters, depending on whether they operate under sequential and simultaneous voting rules, when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many real political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a styl- ized model, we characterize the equilibria for this rule, and compare it to simultaneous voting, and show how these equilibria vary for di¤erent voting costs. This generates a variety of predictions about the relative e¢ ciency and equity of these two systems, which we test using controlled laboratory experiments. Most of the qualitative predictions are supported by the data, but there are signi?cant departures from the predicted equilib- rium strategies, in both the sequential and sumultanous voting games. We ?nd a tradeo¤ between information aggregation, e¢ ciency, and equity in sequential voting: a sequential voting rule aggregates information better, and produces more e¢ cient outcomes on aver- age, compared to simultaneous voting, but sequential voting leads to signi?cant inequities, with later voters ben?tting at the expense of early voters.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/workingpapers/121palfrey.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies. in its series Working Papers with number 81.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pri:cepsud:81

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
Phone: (609) 258-5765
Fax: (609) 258-5398
Email:
Web page: http://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/index.htm
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (David Long).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dekel, E. & Piccione, M., 1999. "Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections," Papers 3-99, Tel Aviv.
    Other versions:
  2. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Steven Callander, 2007. "Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(3), pages 653-684, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas, 2005. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms," Papers 09-19-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
  5. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    Other versions:
  6. Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March. [Downloadable!]
  7. Rothenberg, Lawrence S & Sanders, Mitchell S, 2000. " Legislator Turnout and the Calculus of Voting: The Determinants of Abstention in the U.S. Congress," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 259-70, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Battaglini, Marco, 2005. "Sequential voting with abstention," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 445-463, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 9-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey, 2005. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms," Working Papers 81, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies.. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Camerer, Colin F. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rogers, Brian W., 2006. "Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies," Working Papers 1260, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas, 2005. "The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory," Papers 03-13-2006, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Brian Knight & Nathan Schiff, 2007. "Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries," NBER Working Papers 13637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Battaglimi, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas, . "Information aggregation & strategic abstention in large laboratory elections," Working Papers 1296, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  4. Esteban F. Klory & Eyal Winter, 2006. "On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000451, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Matias Iaryczower, 2008. "Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002394, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2006. "Efficiency, equity, and timing of voting mechanisms," Working Papers 1262, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to register as authors.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.