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Sequential Auctions of Interdependent Objects: Israeli Cable Television Licenses

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  • Gandal, Neil

Abstract

In Israel, area cable television licenses were auctioned sequentially. This paper provides evidence that there were interdependencies among many of the franchises and that subscriber fees for the interdependent franchises decreased over time in this auction. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.

Volume (Year): 45 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 227-44

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:45:y:1997:i:3:p:227-44

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821

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Cited by:
  1. Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, 2002. "Art Auctions: A Survey of Empirical Studies," Working Papers 121, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  2. Gerard Marty & Raphaele Preget, 2007. "A Socio-economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2007-03, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA.
  3. Rasim Ozcan, 2004. "Sequential Auctions with Endogenously Determined Reserve Prices," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 592, Boston College Department of Economics.
  4. Tibor Neugebauer & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2003. "Bidding at Sequential First-Price Auctions with(out) Supply Uncertainty: A Laboratory Analysis," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 558.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. Menezes, Flavio Marques & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, 2000. "Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 364, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  6. Kathryn Graddy & Orley Ashenfelter, 2002. "Auctions and the Price of Art," Economics Series Working Papers 131, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  7. Neugebauer, Tibor & Pezanis-Christou, Paul, 2007. "Bidding behavior at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: A laboratory analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 55-72, May.
  8. Menezes, Flavio Marques & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 1999. "Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 360, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  9. Mezzetti, Claudio, 2008. "Aversion to Price Risk and the Afternoon Effect," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 857, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  10. Klenio Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2012. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," CESifo Working Paper Series 3947, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1998. "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 97jems, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
  12. Antonio Miralles, 2005. "Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition," Working Papers in Economics 132, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  13. Raphaële Préget & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2006. "Un modèle d'estimation de la valeur des lots de bois à partir de résultats d'enchères avec invendus," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 593-603.

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