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CO 2 emission allowance allocation mechanisms, allocative efficiency and the environment: a static and dynamic perspective

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  • Stefan Weishaar

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-007-9020-z
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 24 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 1 (August)
    Pages: 29-70

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:24:y:2007:i:1:p:29-70

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264

    Related research

    Keywords: Allocative efficiency; Allocation systems; Emission trading; CO 2 ; Environment; Performance Standard Rate (PSR); Grandfathering; Auction theory; K32; Environment; Health and Safety;

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    3. Edmonds, Jae & Wise, Marshall & Barns, David W, 1995. "Carbon coalitions : The cost and effectiveness of energy agreements to alter trajectories of atmospheric carbon dioxide emissions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4-5), pages 309-335.
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    7. Ian W. H. Parry & Roberton C. Williams III & Lawrence H. Goulder, 1997. "When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets," NBER Working Papers 5967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    19. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
    20. Munksgaard, Jesper & Pedersen, Klaus Alsted, 2001. "CO2 accounts for open economies: producer or consumer responsibility?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 327-334, March.
    21. Stavins, Robert, 2001. "Lessons from the American Experiment with Market-Based Environmental Policies," Working Paper Series rwp01-032, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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    23. Helm, Carsten, 2003. "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2737-2747, December.
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    29. repec:wop:humbsf:2001-31 is not listed on IDEAS
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