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The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment

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Author Info
Peter Cramton () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)

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Abstract

This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/97jems-fcc-spectrum-auctions.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 97jemsfcc.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 65 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision: 12 Jul 1998
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6:3, Fall 1997, pages 431-495. Reprinted in Donald L. Alexander, Telecommunications Policy, Chapter 5, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 75-130, 1997.
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97jemsfcc

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Cramton).

Related research
Keywords: Auctions; Spectrum Auctions; Multiple-Round Auctions; Efficiency;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jeffrey S. Banks & John O. Ledyard & David P. Porter, 1989. "Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 1-25, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
    Other versions:
  4. Ballard, Charles L & Shoven, John B & Whalley, John, 1985. "General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 128-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  8. Chakravorti, Bhaskar, et al, 1995. "Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for Broadband PCS Spectrum," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 345-73, Summer.
  9. McMillan, John, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-62, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Avery, Christopher, 1998. "Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(2), pages 185-210, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
  13. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-75, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Bykowsky, Mark M. & Cull, Robert J. & Ledyard, John O., 1998. "Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem," Working Papers 916, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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