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The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions

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Author Info
Cramton, Peter

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Abstract

From July 1994 to July 1996, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted nine spectrum auctions, raising about $20 billion for the U.S. Treasury. The auctions assigned thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Were the auctions efficient? Did they award the licenses to the firms best able to turn the spectrum into valuable services for consumers? There is substantial evidence that the FCC's simultaneous ascending auction worked well. it raised large revenues. It revealed critical information in the process of bidding and gave bidders the flexibility to adjust strategies in response to new information. As a result, similar licenses sold for similar prices, and bidders were able to piece together sensible sets of licenses. Copyright 1998 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 41 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 727-36
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:41:y:1998:i:2:p:727-36

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1997. "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 497-527, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
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  4. Ballard, Charles L & Shoven, John B & Whalley, John, 1985. "General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 128-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
  6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Bykowsky, Mark M. & Cull, Robert J. & Ledyard, John O., 1998. "Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem," Working Papers 916, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lawrence White, 2000. ""Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin," Working Papers 00-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Andrés Pereyra, 2001. "Subasta de telefonía móvil: ¿una experiencia inconclusa en Uruguay?," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0302, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tomomi Tanaka, 2005. "Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation," Experimental 0511004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001. [Downloadable!]
  5. Heide Coenen & Manfred J. Holler & Esko Niskanen, 2000. "5th Helsinki Workshop on Standardization and Networks, 13-14 August, 2000," Discussion Papers 243, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT). [Downloadable!]
  6. Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Sander Onderstal & Rupert Sausgruber, 2006. "The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Tomomi Tanaka, 2007. "Resource Allocation with Spatial Externalities: Experiments on Land Consolidation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1). [Downloadable!]
  8. Onderstal, S., 2002. "The chopstick auction," Discussion Paper 35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2006. "Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 197-249, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Matejka, M. & Onderstal, S. & De Waegenaere, A., 2002. "The effectiveness of caps on political lobbying," Discussion Paper 44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  11. Lawrence J. White, 2006. "The Fishery as a Watery Commons: Lessons from the Experiences of Other Public Policy Areas for US Fisheries Policy," Working Papers 06-18, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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