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Simultaneous Ascending Auction

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Author Info
Peter Cramton () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)

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Abstract

The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids enable price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not allowed, the auction format does handle mild complementarities well. I examine the auction design and its performance in practice.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2000-2004/cramton-simultaneous-ascending-auction.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 04mit4.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision: 2004
Publication status: Published in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg, eds., Combinatorial Auctions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, chapter 4, 2006.
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit4

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Cramton).

Related research
Keywords: Auctions Ascending Auctions Market Design

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Brusco, Sandro & Lopomo, Giuseppe, 2002. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(2), pages 407-36, April.
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  3. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1997. "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 497-527, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2002. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 02collude, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 04 Dec 2002. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Auctioning Many Divisible Goods," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 480-493, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
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  7. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Paul Milgrom, 2000. "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 245-272, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Lawrence Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(1), pages 1019-1019. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
  11. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-75, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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