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Auctioning airport slots (?)

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Author Info

  • Nicolas Gruyer

    ()
    (LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC)

  • Nathalie Lenoir

    ()
    (LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC)

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    Abstract

    The current allocation of slots on congested European airports constitutes an obstacle to the effective liberalisation of air transportation undertaken in Europe. With a view to favouring efficient slot utilisation and competition, as is the goal of the European commission, we propose to use a market mechanism, based on temporary utilisation licences. In order to allocate those licences, we propose and describe an iterated combinatorial auction mechanism where a percentage of licences would be reallocated each season. A secondary market would also be set up in order to reallocate slots during a season. Since a combinatorial auction involve a complex optimisation procedure, we describe how it can be made to work in the case of auctions.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school) in its series Economics Working Papers with number 01.

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    Length: 18 pages
    Date of creation: Jun 2003
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:enc:abcdef:auction1

    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 18.
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    Related research

    Keywords: slots; airports; licence; auction; combinatorial;

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    References

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    1. S.J. Rassenti & V.L. Smith & R.L. Bulfin, 1982. "A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 402-417, Autumn.
    2. Ledyard, John O. & Noussair, Charles & Porter, David, . "The Allocation of a Shared Resource Within an Organization," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 917, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    3. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    4. Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000. "Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1296, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Paul Milgrom, 2000. "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 245-272, April.
    6. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
    7. Anthony M. Kwasnica & John O. Ledyard & Dave Porter & Christine DeMartini, 2005. "A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 419-434, March.
    8. Peter Cramton, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 95jems, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
    9. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Jeffrey S. Banks & John O. Ledyard & David P. Porter, 1989. "Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 1-25, Spring.
    11. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
    12. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
    13. Michael H. Rothkopf & Aleksandar Peke\v{c} & Ronald M. Harstad, 1998. "Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 44(8), pages 1131-1147, August.
    14. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
    15. Milgrom, Paul & Weber, Robert J., 1982. "The value of information in a sealed-bid auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 105-114, June.
    16. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
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