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An Optimal Auction for Complements

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  • Levin, Jonathan

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 18 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 176-192

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:176-192

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
  2. Krishna, K., 1990. "Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: The Persistence of Monopoly Revisited," Papers 472, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  3. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-94, March.
  4. S.J. Rassenti & V.L. Smith & R.L. Bulfin, 1982. "A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 402-417, Autumn.
  5. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
  6. repec:att:wimass:9008 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Vijay Krishna & Robert Rosenthal, 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Papers 0056, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  8. Jeffrey S. Banks & John O. Ledyard & David P. Porter, 1989. "Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 1-25, Spring.
  9. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
  10. Gale, Ian, 1990. "A multiple-object auction with superadditive values," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 323-328, December.
  11. Robert W. Rosenthal & Ruqu Wang, 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values," Papers 0060, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  12. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1988. "Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 335-354, December.
  13. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
  14. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  15. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
  16. Chakravorti, Bhaskar, et al, 1995. "Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for Broadband PCS Spectrum," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 345-73, Summer.
  17. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
  18. Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-90, October.
  19. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-99, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2014. "An Efficient and Incentive Compatible Dynamic Auction for Multiple Complements," Discussion Papers 14/06, Department of Economics, University of York.
  2. Levent Ulku, 2009. "Optimal Combinatorial Mechanism Design," Working Papers 0903, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  3. Nicolás Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2011. "Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 213-243, September.
  4. Kumru, Cagri & Yektas, Hadi, 2008. "Optimal Multi-Object Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," MPRA Paper 7575, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti & Justin Leroux & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2011. "Splitting an Uncertain (Natural) Capital," Cahiers de recherche 1105, CIRPEE.
  6. Domenico Menicucci, 2001. "Optimal two-object auctions with synergies," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 18-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  7. Branco, Fernando, 2001. "On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 187-194, February.
  8. Estelle Cantillon & Martin Pesendorfer, 2013. "Combination bidding in multi-unit auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 54289, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  9. Levent Ulku, 2010. "Monotone Implementation," Working Papers 1004, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  10. Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2007. "A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 441-466, March.
  11. Estelle Cantillon, 2002. "Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000091, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Estelle Cantillon & Martin Pesendorfer, . "Combination Bidding in Multi-unit Auctions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/151705, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  13. Veronika Grimm, 2004. "On Procurement Auctions Of Complementary Goods," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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