This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
McAfee, R. Preston
McMillan, John

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYGB7P-G8/2/af47386960e193a88ab8ac70aae2a2fa
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 46 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 335-354
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:46:y:1988:i:2:p:335-354

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Healy, Paul J., 2003. "Learning Dynamics in Mechanism Design: An Experimental Comparison of Public Goods Mechanisms," Working Papers 1182, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  2. Leonardo Rezende, 2009. "Biased procurement auctions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 169-185, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gyu Ho Wang, 2000. "On The Dynamic Incentive Of Price-Quality Differentiation By A Monopolist Firm," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 33-45, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998. [Downloadable!]
  5. Paulo Monteiro & Frank Page, 2008. "Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 503-524, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2001. "Screening Through Bundling," Penn CARESS Working Papers 3b8e0b3847b08b90e8570987c, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  7. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2000. "Financing Education Using Optimal Redistributive Taxation," Working Papers 0038, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised May 2001. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Frank H. Page Jr., 1996. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms for Multiproduct Monopolists: Incentive Compatibility in the Presence of Budget Constraints," Microeconomics 9610002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 1994. "Competition under Nonlinear Pricing," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 34, pages 04, Avril-Jui. [Downloadable!]
  10. Bing Jing & Roy Radner, 2004. "Nonconvex Production Technology and Price Discrimination," Working Papers 04-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Charles Zheng, 2000. "Optimal Auction in a Multidimensional World," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0296, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  12. Miravete, Eugenio J, 2000. "Estimating Demand for Local Telephone Service with Asymmetric Information and Optional Calling Plans," CEPR Discussion Papers 2635, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Pierangelo Mori, 2008. "Design of Multidimensional Franchise Auctions by an Ignorant Principal," Working Papers Series wp2008_13.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche. [Downloadable!]
  14. Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterjee & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000750, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Keith Waehrer, 1997. "Hazardous Facility Siting When Cost Information is Private: An Application of Multidimensional Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9702004, EconWPA, revised 26 Feb 1997. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 1997. "Sequential Screening," Economics Working Papers 224, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Hai Wang & Weidong Zhang & Jingjing Wang, 2007. "Auctioning the state owned enterprise in China: the trade-off between maximizing revenue and minimizing unemployment," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 267-280, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Bing Jing & Roy Radner, 2004. "Nonconvex Production Technology and Price Discrimination," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 513, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  19. Blackorby, Charles & Szalay, Dezsö, 2008. "Regulating a Monopolist with unknown costs and unknown quality capacity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 858, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  20. repec:att:wimass:19199821 is not listed on IDEAS
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Use the JEL tree to browse through the database by subfields.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.