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Abstract

We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 141.

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Date of creation: Feb 2006
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Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:141

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
• D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
• D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2006-07-15 (All new papers)
• NEP-COM-2006-07-15 (Industrial Competition)
• NEP-GTH-2006-07-15 (Game Theory)
• NEP-MIC-2006-07-15 (Microeconomics)

References

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1. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
2. Armstrong, Mark, 2000. "Optimal Multi-object Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 455-81, July.
3. Palfrey, Thomas R, 1983. "Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 463-83, March.
4. Adams, William James & Yellen, Janet L, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 475-98, August.
5. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
6. Gui,Hongwei & Müller,Rudolf & Vohra,Rakesh, 2004. "Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types," Research Memoranda 047, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
   
   • Hongwei Gui & Rudolf M¨uller & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2004. "Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types," Discussion Papers 1392, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
7. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "A Note on Revenue Maximization and Efficiency in Multi-Object Auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-73, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
   
   • Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2001. "A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(2), pages 1-5.
   • Jehiel, P & Moldovanu, B, 2001. "A note on revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions," Open Access publications from University College London http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
8. Indranil Chakraborty, 1999. "Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 723-733.
9. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
10. Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-90, October.
11. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
12. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John & Whinston, Michael D, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 371-83, May.
13. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
    
    • John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
14. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Working Papers 02004, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    
    • Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul R. Milgrom, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 0(1), pages 1.
15. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1979. "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1137-44, September.
16. Avery, Christopher & Hendershott, Terrence, 2000. "Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 483-97, July.
17. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April.
18. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
19. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, E., 1997. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    
    • Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 258-293, April.
20. J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Working papers 311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    
    • Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.

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Citations

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Cited by:

1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 142, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   
   • Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001129, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
2. Miravete, Eugenio J., 2011. "Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 479-490.
3. Pagnozzi, Marco, 2009. "Resale and bundling in auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 667-678, November.
   
   • Marco Pagnozzi, 2007. "Resale and Bundling in Auctions," CSEF Working Papers 186, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
4. Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan, 2012. "Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items," Discussion Paper Series dp606, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
   
   • Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan, 2012. "Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000433, David K. Levine.
5. Chakraborty, Indranil, 2006. "Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 31-46, January.

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