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The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design

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Author Info
Vasiliki Skreta
Nicolas Figueroa

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Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 08-12.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:08-12

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Postal: New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126
Phone: (212) 998-0860
Fax: (212) 995-4218
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Armstrong, Mark, 2000. "Optimal Multi-object Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 455-81, July.
  2. Fernando Branco, 1996. "Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 77-101.
  3. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Avery, Christopher & Hendershott, Terrence, 2000. "Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 483-97, July.
  5. Gale, Ian, 1990. "A multiple-object auction with superadditive values," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 323-328, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Krishna, Vijay & Maenner, Eliot, 2001. "Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1113-19, July.
  7. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-29, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998. [Downloadable!]
  9. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-22, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
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  11. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Economics Papers 2004-W09, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Jorge Aseff & Hector Chade, 2004. "An optimal auction with identity-dependent externalities," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 254, Econometric Society.
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  13. Dana, James Jr. & Spier, Kathryn E., 1994. "Designing a private industry : Government auctions with endogenous market structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 127-147, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 258-293, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2001. "A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3, pages 1-5. [Downloadable!]
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  18. repec:att:wimass:19908 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, 1988. "Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 15-19. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000222, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2007. "A Note on Optimal Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000232, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Working Papers 08-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kucuksenel, Serkan, . "Interim efficient mechanism design with interdependent valuations," Working Papers 1254, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  5. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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