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Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities : Vickrey Versus the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction

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  • Laurent Lamy

    (Crest)

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    Abstract

    We introduce contingent auction mechanisms, which is a supersetof combinatorial auctions, and where bidders submit bids on packagesthat are contingent on the whole nal assignment. Without externalities,the Vickrey and the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction areboth robust if items are perceived as substitutes. Such an equivalencebetween those formats may not hold with externalities and theanalog of the substitute condition is a complex unexplored issue. Weanalyse those issues in the Negative Group-Dependent Externalitiesframework, a general structure with allocative externalities betweenjoint-purchasers.

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    File URL: http://www.crest.fr/images/doctravail/2007-26.pdf
    File Function: Crest working paper version
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 2007-26.

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    Length: 42
    Date of creation: 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2007-26

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