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System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction

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Abstract

The present invention primarily concerns hybrid auctions that may, for example, combine a clock auction with a proxy auction. Hybrid auctions include multi-item auctions that comprise at least two phases of package auctions: an earlier phase in which bidders participate in a clock auction (or other dynamic auction); and a later phase in which bidders participate in a proxy auction (or some other package auction). By combining the earlier phase and the later phase as in some of the embodiments described herein, it is possible to combine the advantages of the dynamic auction and the advantages of the sealed-bid package auction. In particular, if the earlier phase is a clock auction and the later phase is a proxy auction, then the resulting hybrid auction will combine the transparency and simplicity of the clock auction with the efficient outcome and competitive revenues of the proxy auction.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 10acmhc.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision: 2012
Publication status: Published in US Patent No. 7,729,975 issued 1 June 2010
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10acmhc

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Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

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Keywords: Auctions; clock auctions; spectrum auctions; market design;

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