Protecting the Wnner: Second-price Versus Oral Auctions

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Protecting the Wnner: Second-price Versus Oral Auctions

Author Info

Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R.
Kahn, C.M.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Charles Milton Kahn

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Chicago - Economics Research Center in its series University of Chicago - Economics Research Center with number 90-8.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:chicer:90-8

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, ECONOMICS RESEARCH CENTER, NORC, CHICAGO ILLINOIS 60637 U.S.A.
Phone: (773)834-0761
Web page: http://economics.uchicago.edu/research.shtml
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Kahn, Charles M., 1991. "Protecting the winner : Second-price versus oral auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 243-248, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

repec:att:wimass:19199933 is not listed on IDEAS
Elena Grigorieva & P. Herings & Rudolf Müller & Dries Vermeulen, 2007. "The private value single item bisection auction," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 107-118, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Grigorieva,Elena & Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Müller,Rudolf & Vermeulen,Dries, 2002. "The private value single item bisection auction," Research Memoranda 051, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
Grigorieva,Elena & Herings,Jean-Jacques & Müller,Rudolf & Vermeulen,Dries, 2004. "The communication complexity of private value single item auctions," Research Memoranda 052, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? Each page is provided with a technical contact, in case something is not right with the supplied information. See under "publisher info".

This page was last updated on 2008-8-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.