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Auctioning Securities

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Author Info
Lawrence M. Ausubel () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)
Peter Cramton () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)

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Abstract

Treasury debt and other divisible securities are traditionally sold in either a pay-your-bid (discriminatory) auction or a uniform-price auction. We compare these auction formats with a Vickrey auction and also with two ascending-bid auctions. The Vickrey auction and the alternative ascending-bid auction (Ausubel 1996) have important theoretical advantages for sellers. In a setting without private information, these auctions achieve the maximal revenue as a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies. In contrast, the pay- your-bid, uniform-price, and standard ascending-bid auction admit a multiplicity of equilibria that yield low revenues for the seller. We show how these results extend to a setting where bidders have affiliated private information. Our results question the standard ways that securities are offered to the public.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/98wp-auctioning-securities.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 98wpas.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1997
Date of revision: Mar 1998
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98wpas

Note: Working Paper
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Cramton).

Related research
Keywords: Auctions Multi-Unit Auctions Security Auctions Treasury Auctions

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 1999. "Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 193-220, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Harstad, Ronald M, 1990. "Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 421-29, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. V.V. Chari & Robert J. Weber, 1992. "How the U.S. Treasury should auction its debt," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 3-12. [Downloadable!]
  5. Avery, Christopher, 1998. "Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(2), pages 185-210, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Noussair, Charles, 1995. "Equilibria in a Multi-object Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction with Multi-unit Demands," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 337-51, March.
  7. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Robert J. Weber, 1981. "Multiple-Object Auctions," Discussion Papers 496, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1996. "Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1271-83, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
  12. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-64. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, 1988. "Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 15-19. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kjell Sunnevåg, 2001. "Auction design for the allocation of multiple units of a homogenous good: Theoretical background and practical experience," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp4-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  2. Sara Castellanos, 2001. "Mexican treasury securities primary auctions," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000025, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Marco LiCalzi & Alessandro Pavan, 2003. "Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions," Working Papers 2003.22, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ping Zhang, 2005. "Uniform Price Auction and Fixed Price Offerings in IPO: An Experimental Comparison," Discussion Papers 2005-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  5. Peter Cramton, 1998. "Ascending Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98eer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 28 Jul 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2002. "Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform, Discriminatory and Spanish Designs," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 551.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Kjell Sunnevåg, 2003. "Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(3), pages 385-400, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Robert E. Wright, 2002. "Reforming the US IPO market: lessons from history and theory," Accounting, Business and Financial History, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 419-437, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Sara Castellanos, 2001. "A New Empirical Study of the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions: Is there more underpricing?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000206, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. DeMartini, Christine & Kwasnica, Anthony M. & Ledyard, John O. & Porter, David, 1998. "A New and Improved Design For Multi-Object Iterative Auctions," Working Papers 1054, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  11. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
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