Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

System and Method for an Auction of Multiple Types of Items

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

An improved system and method for a computer-implemented auction in which multiple types of items are auctioned together without imposing a particular division of supply or demand among the individual types of items. In some embodiments the auction of the present invention provides a means or method for establishing prices for the types of items, wherein the prices maintain a relationship. In other embodiments, the present invention provides a means or method for implying prices from price parameters in the bids received form bidders, based on a relation among the prices for the types of items. Market clearing may be defined by the condition that the aggregate quantity bid for all types of items is less than or equal to the available quantity of all types of items. The division among the types of items within is thus determined flexibly, based on the bids at the associated prices. In other embodiments, market clearing is defined by the condition that the quantity bid for one selected type of item is less than or equal to the available quantity of the selected type of item. The quantities of the other types of items are thus determined flexibly, based on the bids at the associated prices.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2010-2014/US7899734B2.pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 11acjam.

as in new window
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision: 2012
Publication status: Published in US Patent No. 7,899,734 B2 issued 1 March 2011
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11acjam

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

Related research

Keywords: Auctions; clock auctions; spectrum auctions; market design;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1997. "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 497-527, 09.
  2. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
  3. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
  4. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Mamer, John W., 1997. "Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 385-413, June.
  5. Steven R. Williams, 1999. "A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 155-180.
  6. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
  7. Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 1986, The World Bank.
  8. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
  9. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
  10. Charles R. Plott, 1997. "Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 605-638, 09.
  11. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
  12. Babaioff, Moshe & Feldman, Michal & Nisan, Noam & Winter, Eyal, 2012. "Combinatorial agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 999-1034.
  13. McCabe, Kevin A & Rassenti, Stephen J & Smith, Vernon L, 1990. "Auction Institutional Design: Theory and Behavior of Simultaneous Multiple-Unit Generalizations of the Dutch and English Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1276-83, December.
  14. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Auctioning Many Divisible Goods," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton 04jeea, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11acjam. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Cramton).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.