Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
AbstractWe study the inherent limitations of natural widely-used classes of ascending combinatorial auctions. Specifically, we show that ascending combinatorial auctions that do not use both non-linear prices and personalized prices cannot achieve social efficiency with general bidder valuations. We also show that the loss of efficiency can be severe and that only a diminishing fraction of the social welfare may be captured. This justifies the added complexity in the auctions suggested by, e.g., Parkes and Ungar (2000)  and Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) .
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 145 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Auctions Combinatorial auctions Package auctions Ascending auctions Non-linear prices Personalized prices;
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