This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Ascending auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Cramton, Peter
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
No abstract is available for
this item.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review .
Volume (Year): 42 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3-5 (May)
Pages: 745-756
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML ,
plain text ,
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:745-756Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Peter Cramton, 1997.
"The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment ,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, 09.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1997.
"Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions ,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 497-527, 09.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Bulow, Jeremy I & Huang, Ming & Klemperer, Paul, 1996.
"Toeholds and Takeovers ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1486, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999.
"Toeholds and Takeovers ,"
Finance
9903005, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1996.
"Toeholds and Takeovers ,"
Finance
9608001, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999.
"Toeholds and Takeovers ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 427-454, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1997.
"Auctioning Securities ,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
98wpas, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised Mar 1998.
[Downloadable!]
Cramton, Peter C, 1995.
"Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction ,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
Other versions: Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990.
"Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Harstad, Ronald M, 1990.
"Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 421-29, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Wilson, Robert, 1979.
"Auctions of Shares ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995.
"Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions ,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
[Downloadable!]
McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1996.
"Analyzing the Airwaves Auction ,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives ,
American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-75, Winter.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987.
"Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993.
"Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment ,"
Review of Financial Studies ,
Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-64.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Kjell Sunnevåg, 2001.
"Auction design for the allocation of emission permits ,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
wp5-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
[Downloadable!]
Kjell Sunnevåg, 2001.
"Auction design for the allocation of multiple units of a homogenous good: Theoretical background and practical experience ,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
wp4-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
[Downloadable!]
Peter Cramton, 2002.
"Spectrum Auctions ,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
[Downloadable!]
Kjell Sunnevåg, 2003.
"Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power ,"
Environmental & Resource Economics ,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(3), pages 385-400, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lok,Reinder B. & Romero Morales,Dolores & Vermeulen,Dries, 2005.
"The Agents-are-Substitutes Property in Continuous Generalized Assignment Problems ,"
Research Memoranda
008, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
Benoît Bourbeau & Teodor Gabriel Crainic & Michel Gendreau & Jacques Robert, 2003.
"Design for Optimized Multi-Lateral Multi-Commodity Markets ,"
CIRANO Working Papers
2003s-36, CIRANO.
[Downloadable!]
Pasquale L. Scandizzo & Marco Ventura, 2006.
"Bids for the UMTS system: An empirical evaluation of the Italian case ,"
CEIS Research Paper
88, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
Other versions: Andrés Pereyra, 2001.
"Subasta de telefonía móvil: ¿una experiencia inconclusa en Uruguay? ,"
Documentos de Trabajo (working papers)
0302, Department of Economics - dECON.
[Downloadable!]
Axel Ockenfels, 2002.
"New Institutional Structures on the Internet: The Economic Design of Online Auctions ,"
Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction
2002-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
[Downloadable!]
Frank Riedel & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2004.
"Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
[Downloadable!]
Marja Appelman & Joeri Gorter & Mark Lijesen & Sander Onderstal & Richard Venniker, .
"Equal rules or equal opportunities? Demystifying level playing field ,"
CPB Documents
34, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
[Downloadable!]
Kjell J. Sunnevag, .
"Auction design for the allocation of emission permits ,"
University of California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics
5-01, California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Sherstyuk Katerina, 1999.
"Collision in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions ,"
Working Papers
1063, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Sherstyuk, K., 1999.
"Collusion in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions ,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
707, The University of Melbourne.
Sherstyuk, Katerina, 2002.
"Collusion in private value ascending price auctions ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 177-195, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) LOVO, Stefano & ALBANO, Gian Luigi & GERMANO, Fabrizio, 2002.
"On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects ,"
Les Cahiers de Recherche
765, Groupe HEC.
[Downloadable!]
Veronika Grimm & Frank Riedel & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2001.
"Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
V. Grimm & F. Riedel & E. Wolfstetter, .
"Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany ,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 373
2001-31, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2003.
"Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1557-1569, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Kjell J. Sunnevag, .
"Auction design for the allocation of multiple units of a homogenous good: Theoretical background and practical experience ,"
University of California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics
4-01, California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? All full texts are decentralized with the publishers, none reside on this server, thus making it possible to offer this service for free to all parties.
This page was last updated on 2008-9-15.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .