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Ascending auctions

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Author Info
Cramton, Peter

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-3VKKB1K-X/2/6927d33969ce19df31c88f47a6d134a8
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 42 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3-5 (May)
Pages: 745-756
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:745-756

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1997. "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 497-527, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Bulow, Jeremy I & Huang, Ming & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Toeholds and Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 1486, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1997. "Auctioning Securities," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpas, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised Mar 1998. [Downloadable!]
  5. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
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  6. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Harstad, Ronald M, 1990. "Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 421-29, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
  10. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-75, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-64. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kjell Sunnevåg, 2001. "Auction design for the allocation of emission permits," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp5-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kjell Sunnevåg, 2001. "Auction design for the allocation of multiple units of a homogenous good: Theoretical background and practical experience," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp4-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  3. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kjell Sunnevåg, 2003. "Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(3), pages 385-400, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lok,Reinder B. & Romero Morales,Dolores & Vermeulen,Dries, 2005. "The Agents-are-Substitutes Property in Continuous Generalized Assignment Problems," Research Memoranda 008, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  6. Benoît Bourbeau & Teodor Gabriel Crainic & Michel Gendreau & Jacques Robert, 2003. "Design for Optimized Multi-Lateral Multi-Commodity Markets," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-36, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  7. Pasquale L. Scandizzo & Marco Ventura, 2006. "Bids for the UMTS system: An empirical evaluation of the Italian case," CEIS Research Paper 88, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
    Other versions:
  8. Andrés Pereyra, 2001. "Subasta de telefonía móvil: ¿una experiencia inconclusa en Uruguay?," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0302, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
  9. Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "New Institutional Structures on the Internet: The Economic Design of Online Auctions," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  10. Frank Riedel & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2004. "Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  11. Marja Appelman & Joeri Gorter & Mark Lijesen & Sander Onderstal & Richard Venniker, . "Equal rules or equal opportunities? Demystifying level playing field," CPB Documents 34, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  12. Kjell J. Sunnevag, . "Auction design for the allocation of emission permits," University of California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics 5-01, California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Sherstyuk Katerina, 1999. "Collision in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions," Working Papers 1063, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. LOVO, Stefano & ALBANO, Gian Luigi & GERMANO, Fabrizio, 2002. "On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects," Les Cahiers de Recherche 765, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
  15. Veronika Grimm & Frank Riedel & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2001. "Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Kjell J. Sunnevag, . "Auction design for the allocation of multiple units of a homogenous good: Theoretical background and practical experience," University of California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics 4-01, California Santa Barbara - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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