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Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson

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Listed:
  • Alexander Teytelboym
  • Shengwu Li
  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Mohammad Akbarpour
  • Piotr Dworczak

Abstract

The 2020 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel was awarded to Paul R. Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson for “improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats”. In this survey article, we review the contributions of the laureates, emphasizing the subtle interplay between deep theoretical questions and practical design challenges that resulted in one of the most successful fields of economics.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:123:y:2021:i:3:p:709-750
    DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12441
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