Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy
Abstract
Most of the laboratory research in political science follows the style that was pioneered in experimental economics a half-century ago by Vernon Smith. The connection between this style of political science experimentation and economics experimentation parallels the connection between economic theory and formal political theory.Download Info
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Paper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies. in its series Working Papers with number 91.Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2005
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Handle: RePEc:pri:cepsud:91
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Pedro Dal Bo & Andrew Foster & Louis Putterman, 2010.
"Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2205-29, December.
- Pedro Dal Bo & Andrew Foster & Louis Putterman, 2007. "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy," Working Papers 2007-9, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Pedro Dal Bó & Andrew Foster & Louis Putterman, 2008. "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy," NBER Working Papers 13999, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nese, Annamaria & Sbriglia, Patrizia, 2009. "Social norms in repeated public good games," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 266-281, December.
- Gianluca Grimalda & Anirban Kar & Eugenio Proto, 2008. "On the value of participation: endogenous emergence of social norms in a three-player ultimatum game experiment," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 127-147, April.
- Michalis Drouvelis & Alejandro Saporiti & Nicolaas J Vriend, 2011.
"Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence,"
Discussion Papers
11-15, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Michalis Drouvelis & Alejandro Saporiti & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2011. "Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 682, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Michalis Drouvelis & Alejandro Saporiti & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2011. "Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1119, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2008.
"Monetary Policy by Committee:Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?,"
Cahiers de recherche
2008-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2010. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(1), pages 363-416, February.
- Francisco Ruge-Murcia & Alessandro Riboni, 2008. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?," 2008 Meeting Papers 142, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2008. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?," Cahiers de recherche 02-2008, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Annamaria Nese & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2009. "Individuals' Voting Choice and Cooperation in Repeated Social Dilemma Games," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 025, University of Siena.
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