Using and Abusing Economic Theory
AbstractEconomic Theory is often abused in practical policy-making. There is frequently excessive focus on sophisticated theory at the expense of elementary theory; too much economic knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing. Too little attention is paid to the wider economic context, and to the dangers posed by political pressures. Superficially trivial distinctions between policy proposals may be economically significant, while economically irrelevant distinctions may be politically important. I illustrate with some disastrous government auctions, but also show the value of economic theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 2003-W02.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2002
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/
Other versions of this item:
- A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
- B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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- NEP-ALL-2003-03-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-HPE-2003-03-19 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2003-03-25 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PKE-2003-03-19 (Post Keynesian Economics)
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