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Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents

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Abstract

Changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient. To address this problem the FCC has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders. Often, it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum. Regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency. In particular, giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values but good public information about the cost of relocating the incumbent. We examine the experience of broadband PCS entrants in relocating microwave incumbents. We conclude with some remarks on how these ideas might be applied to digital television spectrum.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/98jle-efficient-relocation.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 98jleer.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 12 Jul 1998
Date of revision: 12 Jul 1998
Publication status: Published in Journal of Law and Economics, 41:2, October 1998, pages 647-675.
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98jleer

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Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
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Keywords: Bargaining; Auctions; Spectrum Auctions; Telecommunications Policy;

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References

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  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  2. Peter Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton 92res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
  3. Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Peter C. Cramton, 1991. "Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 37(10), pages 1221-1233, October.
  5. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1994. "Wage Bargaining with Time-Varying Threats," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(4), pages 594-617, October.
  6. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Peter Cramton, 2009. "Spectrum Auction Design," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton 09sad, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
  2. Thomas W. Hazlett, 2008. "Optimal Abolition of FCC Spectrum Allocation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 103-128, Winter.
  3. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
  4. Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King & Julian Wright, 2005. "Wireless Communications," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series, Monash University, Department of Economics archive-45, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  5. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Crampton & Paul Milgrom, 2004. "The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design," Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 03-034, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  6. Tomomi Tanaka, 2005. "Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation," Experimental, EconWPA 0511004, EconWPA.

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