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Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents

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Author Info
Peter Cramton () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)
Evan Kwerel ()
John Williams ()

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Abstract

Changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient. To address this problem the FCC has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders. Often, it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum. Regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency. In particular, giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values but good public information about the cost of relocating the incumbent. We examine the experience of broadband PCS entrants in relocating microwave incumbents. We conclude with some remarks on how these ideas might be applied to digital television spectrum.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/98jle-efficient-relocation.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 98jleer.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 12 Jul 1998
Date of revision: 12 Jul 1998
Publication status: Published in Journal of Law and Economics, 41:2, October 1998, pages 647-675.
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98jleer

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Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Cramton).

Related research
Keywords: Bargaining; Auctions; Spectrum Auctions; Telecommunications Policy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cramton, Peter C, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 205-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Peter Cramton, 1991. "Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs," Papers of Peter Cramton 91ms, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 15 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
  4. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1994. "Wage Bargaining with Time-Varying Threats," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(4), pages 594-617, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom, 2004. "The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design," Papers of Peter Cramton 04mit5, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lawrence White, 2000. ""Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin," Working Papers 00-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tomomi Tanaka, 2005. "Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation," Experimental 0511004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001. [Downloadable!]
  5. repec:bep:eaptop:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1622-1622 is not listed on IDEAS
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