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Market Integration and Strike Activity

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Author Info
Ana, MAULEON
Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH

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Abstract

We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized imperfectly competitive industries. We investigate the effects of separated product markets opening up for competition as well as of further market integration on the negociated wage and the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. From an initial situation of reciprocal intra-industry trade, an increase in product market integration will decrease the maximal delay in reaching an agreement. However, markets opening up for competition have an ambiguous effect on both the wage outcome and the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques in its series Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) with number 2005025.

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Length: 25
Date of creation: 15 Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005025

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Related research
Keywords: economic integration; product market competition; wage bargaining; strike activity;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Tracy, Joseph S, 1986. "An Investigation into the Determinants of U.S. Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 423-36, June.
  3. Huizinga, Harry, 1993. " International Market Integration and Union Wage Bargaining," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 95(2), pages 249-55.
  4. Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2003. "Market competition and strike activity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 737-758, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Torben M. Andersen & Niels Haldrup & Jan Rose Sørensen, 2000. "Labour market implications of EU product market integration," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 15(30), pages 105-134, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Cramton, Peter C, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 205-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages S87-130, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Dowrick, Steve, 1989. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(398), pages 1123-42, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hongbin Cai, 2003. "Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 583-606, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Davidson, Carl, 1988. "Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(3), pages 397-422, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Naylor, Robin, 1998. "International trade and economic integration when labour markets are generally unionised," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1251-1267, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Francis K. Cheung & Carl Davidson, 1991. "Bargaining Structure and Strike Activity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 345-71, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Cramton, P.C. & Tracy, J.S., 1992. "The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes," Papers e-92-21, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
    Other versions:
  16. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2005. "Strategic union delegation and strike activity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 149-173, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Munch, Jakob Roland & Skaksen, Jan Rose, 2002. " Product Market Integration and Wages in Unionized Countries," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 104(2), pages 289-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Cramton, Peter & Deneckere, Raymond J., 2002. "Bargaining with incomplete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 50, pages 1897-1945 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Ana Mauleon & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 2006. "Strategic union delegation and incentives for merger," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 1-5, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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