Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data
AbstractAttrition, screening, and signalling models of strategic bargaining are characterized in terms of their predictions about the incidence, mean duration, and settlement rates of strikes and the terms of wage settlements. These predictions are compared with the general features observed in empirical studies of strikes in Canada and the United States. Conclusions are drawn about the types of models capable of generating these features, and about the conformity of the models to the evidence. Methods are described for computing the numerical examples used to illustrate the models. Copyright 1989 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Journal of Applied Econometrics.
Volume (Year): 4 (1989)
Issue (Month): S (Supplement, December)
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Web page: http://www.interscience.wiley.com/jpages/0883-7252/
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