Optimum organization of the labor market in a small open economy
AbstractIn Denmark labor has been organized in independent but cooperating craft unions for more than a century. Within an extremely simple model of a small open economy facing imperfect competition, we analyze four different ways of organizing the labor market and show that the Danish model (partial centralization of the wage setting process) may be accounted for as the outcome of a two-stage Nash bargaining game, being robust in relation to changes in market conditions, and likely close to optimum from the point of view of society as a whole.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Labour Economics.
Volume (Year): 19 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco
Labor market organization; Wage bargaining; Craft unions; Industrial cartels;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wallace Hendricks & Larry M. Kahn, 1982. "The determinants of bargaining structure in U.S. manufacturing industries," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(2), pages 181-195, January.
- Moene, Karl O, 1988. "Unions' Threats and Wage Determination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 471-83, June.
- Jun, Byoung Heon, 1989. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 59-76, January.
- De Fraja, Giovanni, 1993. "Staggered vs. synchronised wage setting in oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1507-1522, December.
- Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988.
"Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1984. "Union Rivalry and Wages: An Oligopolistic Approach," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 51(202), pages 129-39, May.
- Davidson, Carl, 1988. "Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(3), pages 397-422, July.
- Zhao, Laixun, 1998. "The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Wages and Employment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 284-301, April.
- Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sørgard, Lars & Straume, Odd Rune, 2003.
"National versus International Mergers in Unionised Oligopoly,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4040, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kjell Erik Lommerud & Odd Rune Straume & Lars Sorgard, 2006. "National Versus International Mergers in Unionized Oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 212-233, Spring.
- Kjell Erik Lommerud & Odd Rune Straume & Lars Sørgard, 2006. "National versus international mergers in unionized oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 212-233, 03.
- Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume, Odd Rune & Sørgard, Lars, 2003. "National versus international mergers in unionised oligopoly," Working Papers in Economics 12/03, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Pemberton, James, 1988. "A 'Managerial' Model of the Trade Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(392), pages 755-71, September.
- Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Union Wage Policy: The Importance of Labour Mobility and the Degree of Centralization," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(230), pages 139-53, May.
- Holden, Steinar & Raaum, Oddbjorn, 1991.
"Wage Moderation and Union Structure,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 409-23, July.
- Naylor, Robin A, 1995. " On the Economic Effects of Multiple Unionism," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(1), pages 161-67, March.
- Horn, Henrik & Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 484-97, June.
- Risager, Ole, 1993. "Labour Substitution in Denmark," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 55(1), pages 123-35, February.
- Munch, Jakob Roland & Skaksen, Jan Rose, 2002. " Product Market Integration and Wages in Unionized Countries," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(2), pages 289-99, June.
- Jonas Björnerstedt & Andreas Westermark, 2009. "The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 301-332, August.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.