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A 'Managerial' Model of the Trade Union

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  • Pemberton, James
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    Abstract

    This paper criticizes the main existing models of the trade union for assuming that union objectives are coterminous with those of union me mbers, thus neglecting the role of the union leadership. The discussi on is related to traditional controversies about whether unions shoul d be seen as "economic" or "political" institutions. A "managerial" model is developed in which overall union objectives are influen ced by both the union's leadership and its membership. The properties of this "political" model are shown to be similar to existing "ec onomic" models. This suggests that recent work on trade unions is mor e broadly based than previously supposed, and that some of the tradit ional controversies about union objectives were misleading. The model is then used to analyze some economic effects of intraunion conflict ts. Copyright 1988 by Royal Economic Society.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

    Volume (Year): 98 (1988)
    Issue (Month): 392 (September)
    Pages: 755-71

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    Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:98:y:1988:i:392:p:755-71

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    Cited by:
    1. Holden, S., 1990. "Insiders And Outsiders In Labour Market Models," Memorandum 02/1990, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    2. Goerke, Laszlo & Madsen, Jakob B., 2003. "Earnings-Related Unemployment Benefits in a Unionised Economy," IZA Discussion Papers 701, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Blomgren-Hansen, Niels, 2012. "Optimum organization of the labor market in a small open economy," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 222-231.
    4. Norback, Pehr-Johan, 2001. "Cumulative effects of labor market distortions in a developing country," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 135-152, June.
    5. Dumont, Michel & Rayp, Glenn & Willemé, Peter, 2012. "The bargaining position of low-skilled and high-skilled workers in a globalising world," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 312-319.
    6. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 1999. "A trade union model with endogenous militancy: interpreting the French case," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 355-373, September.
    7. Bhattacharyya, Chandril & Gupta, Manash Ranjan, 2014. "Unionised Labour Market, Unemployment Allowances, Productive Public Expenditure and Endogenous Growth," MPRA Paper 56491, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Chongvilaivan, Aekapol & Hur, Jung & Riyanto, Yohanes E., 2013. "Labor union bargaining and firm organizational structure," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 116-124.

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