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Decentralized One‐To‐Many Bargaining

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  • Chiu Yu Ko
  • Duozhe Li

Abstract

We study a one‐to‐many bargaining model in which one active player bargains with every passive player on how to share the surplus of a joint project. The order of bargaining is not fixed and the active player decides whom to bargain with in each period. Our model admits a rich set of equilibria and we identify the upper and lower bounds of equilibrium payoffs. We also examine whether two natural ordering protocols often assumed in existing studies can sustain endogenously. Although the queuing protocol may indeed arise in an equilibrium, the rotating protocol is in general not self‐enforcing.

Suggested Citation

  • Chiu Yu Ko & Duozhe Li, 2020. "Decentralized One‐To‐Many Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1139-1172, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:61:y:2020:i:3:p:1139-1172
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12452
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    Cited by:

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