Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 43 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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2007-10, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
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- Jonas Björnerstedt & Andreas Westermark, 2009. "The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 301-332, August.
- Thomas Gall, 2005.
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- Thomas Gall, 2010. "Inequality, Incomplete Contracts, And The Size Distribution Of Business Firms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(2), pages 335-364, 05.
- Sabien Dobbelaere & Roland Iwan Luttens, 2013. "The Economics of First-Contract Mediation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-096/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Dobbelaere, Sabien & Luttens, Roland Iwan, 2013. "The Economics of First-Contract Mediation," IZA Discussion Papers 7541, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2009. "Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 318-338, March.
- Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Delay in Bargaining with Externalities," Working Paper Series 2006:29, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Bargaining and Strategic Discrimination," Working Paper Series 2006:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
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