# Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory

# Papers

**Contact information of Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory:**

Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A.

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(Thomas Krichel)** **Series handle:** repec:fth:michet
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### 1999

**99-08 Quantifying the Half-Life of Deviations from PPP: The Role of Economic Priors***by*Kilian, L. & Zha, T.**99-07 Private Information and Trade Timing***by*Smith, L.**99-06 A Portrait of the Artist as a Young, Middle-Aged, and Elderly Man***by*Lanyon, G.R. & Smith, L.**99-05 Size Distortions of Tests of the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity: Evidence and Implications for the PPP Debate***by*Kilian, L. & Caner, M.**99-04 Data-Driven Nonparametric Spectral Density Estimators for Economic Time Series: A Monte Carlo Study***by*Kilian, L. & Bergean, I.**99-02 Unit Roots, Trend Breaks and Transitory Dynamics: A Macroeconomic Perspective***by*Kilian, L. & Ohanian, L.E.**99-01 On the Finite-Sample Accuracy of Nonparametric Resampling Algorithms for Economic Time Series***by*Berkowitz, J. & Birgean, I. & Kilian, L.

### 1998

**98-15 Technology, Trade, and Increasing Inequality: Does the Cause Matter for the Cure***by*Deardorff, A.V.**98-14 Fragmentation Across Cones***by*Deardorff, A.V.**98-12 Benefits and Costs of Following Comparative Advantage***by*Deardorff, A.V.**98-11 Fragmentation in Simple Trade Models***by*Deardorff, A.V.**98-09 Assortive Matching and Search***by*Shimer, R. & Smith, L.**98-08 Instrumental Variable Estimation Based on Mean Absolute Deviation***by*Sakata, S.**98-07 An Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Procedure and Proposed Reform***by*Wang, H.J. & White, M.**98-06 How Reliable Are VAR Estimates of Responses to Monetary bPolicy Shocks?***by*Kilian, L. & Chang, P.L.**98-05 Analyzing Unit Root Tests in Finite Samples Using Power Profiles***by*Kilian, L. & Caner, M.**98-04 Pitfalls in Constructing Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for Asymptotically Pivotal Statistics***by*Kilian, L.**98-03 Why Don't More Households File for Bankruptcy?***by*White, M.J.**98-02 Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at Incentives Under U.S. Bankruptcy Laws and A Proposal for Change***by*White, M.J.**98-01 The Bankruptcy Decision: Does Stigma Matter?***by*Fay, S. & Hurst, E. & White, M.J.

### 1997

**97-14 Residual-Based Bootstrap Tests for Normality in Autoregressions***by*Kilian, L. & Demiroglu, U.**97-10 Issues of Environmental and Labor Standards in the Global Trading System***by*Brown, D.K. & deardroff, A.V. & Stern, R.M.**97-08 Private Storage of Common Property***by*Gaudet, G. & Moreaux, M. & Salant, S.W.**97-07 Intertemporal and Spatial Depletion of Landfills***by*Gaudet, G. & Moreaux, M. & Salant, S.W.**97-06 Optimal Asymmetric Strategies in Research Joint Ventures***by*Salant, S.W. & Shaffer, G.**97-04 The Effects of Wage Distortions on the Transition: Theory and Evidence from China***by*Gordon, R.H. & Li, D.D.**97-03 Walrasian Equilibrium Without Complementarities***by*Gul, F. & Stacchetti, E.

### 1995

**95-10 When is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction Under Free Access Correct? -- A Game - Theoretic Justification for Non Game-Theoretic Analyses***by*Brooks, R. & Controneo, J. & Murray, M. & Salant, S.**95-09 Deducing Implications of Fitness Maximization when a Tradeoff Exists Among Alternative Currencies***by*Salant, S. & kalat, K.L. & Wheatcroft, A.M.**95-08 Evolution of Bihavior in Family Games***by*Bergstrom, T.**95-07 Economics of a Family Way***by*Bergstrom, T.**95-06 Gain from Trade in the Optimal Control of Environmental Externalities : Evidence from Acid Rain Abatement in the Eastern United States and Canada***by*Bui, L.T.M.**95-05 Determinants of Bilateral Trade : Does Gravity Work in a Neoclassical World?***by*Deardorff, A.V.**95-04 Collapses of Fixed Exchange-rate Regimes as Breakdown in Cooperation : the EMS in 1992-1993 and the Transition to EMU***by*De Arcangelis, G.**95-03 Implementation in Generalized Matching Problems***by*Sonmez, T.**95-02 Strategy-Proofness and Singleton Cores in Generalized Matching Problems***by*Sonmez, T.**95-01 Strategy-Proofness in Many-To-One Matching Problems***by*Sonmez, T.

### 1994

**94-16 Rendering Alternative Offerings Less Profitable with Resale Price Maintenance***by*Shaffer, G.**94-15 Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Foreclosure, and Exclusive Dealing***by*O'Brien, D.P. & Shaffer, G.**94-07 The Behavior of the Chinese State Enterprises Under the Dual Influence of the Government and the Market***by*Li, D.D.**94-06 Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Statistical Models--Some Monte Carlo Results***by*Lee, L.F.**94-05 Economic FACs about the Internet***by*Mackie-Mason, J.K. & Varian, H.R.**94-02 Competitive Coupon Targeting***by*Shaffer, G. & Zhang, Z.J.**94-01 Do Low-Price Guarantees Facilitate Collusion?***by*Hviid, M. & Shaffer, G.

### 1993

**93-31 Benefits-Cost Analysis and Distortionary Taxes: A Public Choice Approach***by*Bergstrom, T.**93-30 The Political Economy of Subsidized Day Care***by*Bergstrom, T. & Blomquist, S.**93-29 Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Discrete Models With Group Data***by*Lee, L.F.**93-28 Different Environmental Services for Different Income Groups in LDC Cities: Second Best Efficiency Arguments***by*Fischer, C & Porter, R.C.**93-27 On the Private Provision of Public Goods: A Diagrammatic Exposition***by*Ley, E.**93-26 Large Shareholders, Private Benefits of Control and Optimal Schemes for Privatization***by*Li, D.D. & Cornelli, F.**93-25 Procyclical Productivity: Overhead Inputs or Cyclical Utilization***by*Basu, S.**93-24 The Welfare Effects of Forbidding Discriminatory Discounts: A Secundary Line Analysis of Robinson- Patman***by*Shaffer, G. & O'Brien, D.P.**93-23 Intermediate Goods and Business Cycles: Implications for Productivity and Welfare***by*Basu, S.**93-22 Are Apparent Productive Spillovers a Figment of Specification Error***by*Basu, S. & Fernald, J.G.**93-21 The Causes of Business Cycle and the Cyclicality of Real Wages***by*Fleishman, C.A.**93-20 Rational Expectations in Limited Dependent Variable Models***by*Lee, L.F.**93-19 Constant Returns and Small Markups in U.S. Manufacturing***by*Basu, S.: Fernald, J.G.**93-18 Estimating the Cyclicality of Marginal Costs Directly***by*Basu, S.**93-16 Some Economists of the Internet***by*MacKie-Mason, J.K. & Varian, H.L.**93-15 Coase, Competitions, and Compensation***by*Varian, H.R.**93-14 What Use is Economic Theory?***by*Varian, H.R.**93-13 Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals***by*Stacchetti, E. & Pearce, D.**93-12 Rationalizable Predatory Pricing***by*Roth, D.**93-10 A Theory of Partnership Dynamics: Learning, Specific Investment, and Dissolution***by*Roth, D.**93-05 Semiparametric Estimation of Simultaneous Equation Microeconometric Models with Index Restrictions***by*Lee, L.F.**93-04 The Computation of Opportunity Costs in Polytomous Choice Models with Selectivity***by*Lee, L.F.**93-02 A Survey of Theories of the Family***by*Bergstrom, T.C.**93-01 How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment***by*Bergstrom, T.C. & Stark, O.

### 1992

**93-11 A Computational Algorithm for Optimal Collusion in Dynamic Cournot Oligopoly***by*Roth, D.**93-09 Financial Arbitragers and the Efficiency of Corporate Control***by*Li, D.D.**93-08 Information, Control Right and Distressed Firms' Choices Between Workoutss and Bankruptcy***by*Li, D.D. & Li, S.**93-07 Public Ownership as a Sufficient Condition for the Soft Budget Constraint***by*Li, D.D.**93-06 Optimal Asymmetric Strategies in Research Joint Ventures: A Comment on the Literature***by*Salant, S.W. & Shaffer, G.**93-03 Asymptotic Bias in Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimation of Discrete Choice Models***by*Lee, L.F.**92-11 Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public Goods***by*Andreoni, J. & Bergstrom, T.**92-10 Income Prospects and Age at Marriage***by*Bergstrom, T. & Schoeni, R.**92-09 Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device***by*White, M.J.**92-07 Consistent Estimation of Linear and Nonlinear Errors-in- variables Models with Validation Information***by*Lee, L.F. & Sepanski, J.H.**92-06 Non-Linear Contracts, Foreclosure, and Exclusive Dealing***by*O'Brien, D.P. & Shaffer, G.**92-05 Intertemporal Self-Selection with Multiple Buyers Under Complete and Incomplete Information***by*Bagholi, M. & Salant, S.W. & Swierzbinski, J.E.**92-04 Cartel Quotas Under Majority Rule***by*Cave, J. & Salant, S.**92-03 The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition: Further Results***by*Salant, S. & Gaudet, G.**92-02 Surviving Winter: A Fitness-Based Explanation of Hoarding and Hibernation***by*Salant, S. & Kalat, K. & Wheatcroft, A.**92-01 Asymptotic Distribution of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator for Stochastic Frontier Function Model with a Singular Information Matrix***by*Lee, L.F.

### 1991

**92-08 Semiparametric Minimum-Distance Estimation***by*Lee, L.F.**91-08 Capturing Strategic Rent : Full-Line Forcing, Maximum Resale Price Maintenance, Brand Discount and Aggregate Rebates***by*Shaffer, G.**91-7 The Two-Sex Problem and the Marriage Squeeze in an Equilibrium Model of Mariage Market***by*Bergstrom, T. & Lam, D.**91-5 The Existence of Pareto Superior Price Limits and Trading Halts***by*Kodres, L.E. & O'Brien, D.P.**91-4 Peak-Load Pricing-with and without Constrained Rate of reforn***by*Bergstrom, T. & Mackie-Mason, J.K.**91-3 Courtship as a Waiting Game***by*Bergstrom, T. & Bagnali, M.**91-2 Multiple Minima in the Estimation of Models with Autoregressive Disturbances***by*Doran, H. & Kmenta, J.**91-1 Price Discrimination and Intertemporal Self-Selection***by*Bagnoli, M. & Salant, S.W. & Swierzbinski, J.E.**90-17 Evolutionary Stability in Repeated games Played by Finite Automata***by*Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L.**90-16 Foudations of Game Theory***by*Binmore, K.**90-15 Growth and International Investment with Diverging Population***by*Deardorff, A.V.**18 When Non-Transitive Relations Take Maxima and Competitive Equilibrium Can't Be Beat***by*Bergstrom, T.**17 Bargaining and Morality***by*Binmore, K.**16 DeBayesing Game Theory***by*Binmore, K.**15 A Liberal Leviathan***by*Binmore, K.**14 Sequential Provision of Public Goods***by*Varian, H.R.**13 Goodness of Fit for Revealed Preference Tests***by*Varian, H.R.**11 The Economics of User Interface***by*Varian, H,R.**10 A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed***by*Varian, H,R.

### 1990

**90-20 Decentralized Dynamic Processes for Finding Equilibrium***by*Reiter, S. & Simon, C.**90-19 Estimation of the Covariance Matrix of the Least Squares regression Coefficients when the Disturbance Covariance Matrix is of Unknown Form***by*Keener, R.W. & Kmenta, J. & Weber, N.C.**90-18 Vertical Control in Markets with Multilateral Competition***by*O'Brien, D.P. & Shaffer, G.**90-14 For Sale by Owner: When to Use a Realtor and How to Price the House***by*Salant, S.W.**90-13 Marriage and Neutrality***by*Laitner, J.**90-12 Courtship as a Waiting Game***by*Bergstrom, T. & Bagnoli, M.**90-07 Why Are Taxes So Complex And Who Benefits?***by*White, M.J.**90-02 Sequential Provision Of Public Goods***by*Varian, H.R.**90-01 A Solution To The Problem Of Externalities And Public Goods When Agents Are Well-Informed***by*Varian, H.R.

### 1989

**91-6 The Effects of Cohort Size on Mariage Market in Twentieth Century Sweden***by*Bergstrom, T. & Lam, D.**90-10 Bargaining Without Tears***by*Binmore, K.**90-09 Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids***by*Bagnoli, M. & Lipman, B.**90-08 Endogenous Price Leadership: A Bargaining Model Of International Telecommunications Settlements***by*O'Brien, D.**90-06 Slotting Allowances And Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparaison Of Facilitating Practices***by*Shaffer, G.**90-05 Testing Hypotheses About Regression Coefficients In Misspecified Models***by*Bhattacharyya, D.K. & Kmenta, J.**90-04 International Trade With Lumpy Countries***by*Courant, P.N. & Deardorff, A.V.**90-03 Goodness-Of-Fit Optimizing Models***by*Varian, H.R.**90-01a Non-Partitional Information On Dynamic State Spaces And The Possibility Of Speculation***by*Song Shin, H.**89-27 Your Terms Or Mine? The Duty To Read The Fine Print In Contracts***by*Katz, A.**89-26 Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining***by*Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A.**89-25 Predicting Committee Behavior In Majority-Rule Voting Experiments***by*Salant, S.W. & Goodstein, E.**89-24 Towards A Theory Of Horizontal Mergers***by*Gaudet, G. & Salant, S.**89-23 Log-Concave Probability And Its Applications***by*Bagnoli, M. & Bergstrom, T.**89-22 Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake***by*Robson, A.J.**89-21 Stock Market Forecastability And Volatility: A Statistical Appraisal***by*Mankiw, N.G. & Romer, D. & Shapiro, M.D.**89-20 Volumtary Provision Of Public Goods: The Multiple Unit Case***by*Bagnoli, M. & Ben-David, S. & Mckee, M.**89-19 Distance, Demand, And Oligopoly Pricing***by*Feenstra, R.C. & Levinsohn, J.A.**89-18 Monitoring Agents With Other Agents***by*Varian, H.R.**89-17 Sequential Provision Of Public Goods***by*Varian, H.R.**89-16 A Simple, Consistent Estimator For Disturbance Components In Financial Models***by*Levinsohn, J. & Mackie-Mason, J.**89-15 Do People Exploit Their Bargaining Power? An Experimental Study***by*Binmore, K. & Morgan, P. & Shaked, A. & Sutton, J.

### 1988

**89-14 Some Fine-Tuning For Dominant Diagonal Matrices***by*Simon, C.P.**89-13 An Ampirical Test Of The Efficiency Of Liability Rules In Accident Law***by*White, M.J.**89-12 Legal Complexity***by*White, M.J.**89-11 Goodness-Of-Fit In Demand Analysis***by*Varian, H.R.**89-10 Uniqueness Of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results From Old Methods***by*Gaudet, G. & Salant, S.**89-09 The Profitability Of Exogenous Output Contactions***by*Gaudet, G. & Salant, S.**89-08 The Founding Of The Fed And The Destabilization Of The Post-1914 Economy***by*Miron, J.A.**89-07 A Cross-Country Comparaison Of Seasonal Cycles And Business Cycles***by*Miron, J.A.**89-06 A Common Knowledge And Game Theory***by*Binmore, K. & Brandeburge, A.**89-05 Social Contract Iii: Evolution And Utilitarianism***by*Binmore, K.**89-04 Social Contract Ii: Gauthier And Nash***by*Binmore, K.**89-03 Social Contract I: Harsanyi And Rawls***by*Binmore, K.**89-02 Some Simple Analysis Of Peak-Load Pricing***by*Bergstrom, T. & Mackie-Mason, J.**89-01 Carrot And Yardstick Regulation: Enhancing Market Performance With Output Prizes***by*Bagnoli, M. & Borenstein, S.**88-13 Price Discrimination And Patent Policy***by*Hausman, J.A. & Mackie-Mason, J.K.**88-12 Notes On Peak Load Pricing***by*Bergstrom, T. & Mackie-Mason, J.**88-11 A Note On Optimal Contract Damages When Litigation Is Costly***by*Katz, A.**88-10 Urban Commuting Journeys Are Not Wasteful***by*White, M.J.**88-5 Pacman Refutes The Coase Conjecture: Durable-Goods Monopoly With Discrete Demand***by*Bagnoli, M. & Salant, S.W. & Swierzbinski, J.E.**88-3 Competition And Product Line Choice***by*Bagnoli, M. & Barbeau, J.B.