When is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction Under Free Access Correct? -- A Game - Theoretic Justification for Non Game-Theoretic Analyses
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory in its series Papers with number 95-10.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A.
COMMON PROPERTY; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM; GAME THEORY;
Other versions of this item:
- Robin Brooks & Michael Murray & Stephen Salant & Jill C. Weise, 1999. "When Is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access Correct? A Game-Theoretic Justification for Non-Game-Theoretic Analyses," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(4), pages 843-858, August.
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- Colin Rowat & Jayasri Dutta, 2007.
"The Commons with Capital Markets,"
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- Colin Rowat & Jayasri Dutta, 2004. "The commons with capital markets," GE, Growth, Math methods 0412002, EconWPA.
- Colin Rowat and Jayasri Dutta, 2004. "The commons with capital markets," Discussion Papers 05-01, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Colin Rowat and Jayasri Dutta, 2005. "The Commons with Capital Markets," Discussion Papers 05-19, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- López-Feldman, Alejandro & Edward Taylor, J., 2009. "Labor allocation to non-timber extraction in a Mexican rainforest community," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 205-221, August.
- Holland, Stephen P. & Moore, Michael R., 2000. "Cadillac Desert Revisited: Property Rights, Public Policy, And Water-Resource Depletion In The American West," 2000 Annual meeting, July 30-August 2, Tampa, FL 21861, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Hotte, Louis & McFerrin, Randy & Wills, Douglas, 2013.
"On the dual nature of weak property rights,"
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Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 659-678.
- Brozovic, Nicholas & Sunding, David L. & Zilberman, David, 2004. "Measuring The Gains From Management Of Spatially Heterogeneous Resources: The Case Of Groundwater," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20240, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- HOTTE, Louis, 1997.
"Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights,"
Cahiers de recherche
9720, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Louis Hotte, 2005. "Natural-resource exploitation with costly enforcement of property rights," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 497-521, July.
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