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Markov Perfect Nash Equilibria in a Class of Resource Games

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Author Info
Gerhard Sorger

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Abstract

A standard model of the exploitation of a renewable resource by non-cooperating agents is considered. Under the assumption that the resource is sufficiently productive we prove that there exist infinitely many Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). Although these equilibria lead to overexploitation of the resource (tragedy of the commons) it is shown that for any T > 0 there exist MPNE with the property that the resource stock stays in an arbitrary small neighborhood of the efficient steady state for at least T time periods. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for maximal exploitation of the resource to qualify as a MPNE and show that this condition is satisfied if there are sufficiently many players, or if the players are sufficiently impatient, or if the capacity of each player is sufficiently high.

On analyse un modèle standard de l'exploitation des ressources renouvelables par des agents non-coopératifs. Dans le cas où les ressources sont suffisamment productives, on démontre l'existence d'un continuum d'équilibres Markov-parfaits de Nasch (EMPN). Quoique ces équilibres entrainent la surconsommation des ressources, on peut prouver que pour chaque T > 0, il y a des EMPN ayant la propriété que le stock de ressources demeure dans un voisinage arbitrairement petit de l'état stationnaire optimal pendant au moins T périodes. De plus, on obtient une condition nécessaire et suffisante pour que l'exploitation maximale des ressources soit un EMPN. On démontre que cette condition est vérifiée dans le cas où soit il y a beaucoup d'agents, soit les agents sont impatients, soit la capacité de chaque agent est grande.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 96s-15.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 1996
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:96s-15

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Related research
Keywords: Renewable resources; differential game; Markov perfect equilibria; multiple equilibria; Ressources renouvelables; jeu différentiel; équilibres Markov-parfaits; équilibres multiples;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Benhabib, Jess & Radner, Roy, 1992. "The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 155-90, April.
  2. Dutta, Prajit K & Sundaram, Rangarajan, 1992. "Markovian Equilibrium in a Class of Stochastic Games: Existence Theorems for Discounted and Undiscounted Models," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 197-214, April.
  3. Benhabib, Jess & Radner, Roy, 1988. "Joint Exploitation Of A Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Working Papers 88-17, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Stokey, Nancy L, 1985. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 161-73, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dockner, Engelbert J. & Sorger, Gerhard, 1996. "Existence and Properties of Equilibria for a Dynamic Game on Productive Assets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 209-227, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Skiba, A K, 1978. "Optimal Growth with a Convex-Concave Production Function," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 527-39, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Colin Rowat & Jayasri Dutta, 2004. "The commons with capital markets," GE, Growth, Math methods 0412002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ken-Ichi Akao, 2008. "Tax schemes in a class of differential games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 155-174, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Roy Radner & Prajit K. Dutta, 2005. "A Strategic Analysis of Global Warming: Theory and Some Numbers," Working Papers 05-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. F. Cabo & E. Escudero & G. Martín-Herrán, 2002. "Towards an ecological technology for global growth in a North-South trade model," Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 15-41, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Christos Koulovatianos & Elena Antoniadou & Leonard J.Mirman, 2007. "Strategic Exploitation of a Common-Property Resource under Uncertainty," Vienna Economics Papers 0703, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jayasri Dutta & Colin Rowat, 2004. "The Road to Extinction: Commons with Capital Markets," GE, Growth, Math methods 0412001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Salvador Ortigueira, 2004. "Markovian Optimal Taxation," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 10, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Y. Hossein Farzin & Ken-Ichi Akao, 2006. "When is it Optimal to Exhaust a Resource in a Finite Time?," Working Papers 2006.23, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  9. Salvador Ortigueira, 2006. "Markov-Perfect Optimal Taxation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(1), pages 153-178, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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