This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Markovian Optimal Taxation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Salvador Ortigueira

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper we study optimal taxation in a dynamic game played by a sequence of governments, one for each time period, and a private sector composed of a continuum of households. We focus on the Markov-Perfect equilibrium of this game under two assumptions on the extent of government's intra-period commitment, which in turn define two notions of time consistency of the Markov-Perfect policy. Our results show that the extent of government's intra-period commitment has important quantitative implications for policies, welfare, and macroeconomic variables, and consequently that it must be explicitly stated as one of the givens of the economy, alongside preferences, markets and technology. We see this as an important result, since most of the previous literature on Markovian optimal taxation has assumed, either interchangeably or unnoticeably, different degrees of government's intra-period commitment.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repec.org/sce2004/up.11709.1075059561.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 with number 10.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf4:10

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://comp-econ.org/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Markov-Perfect Optimal Taxation; Time-Consistent policies; Instantaneous and Non-Instantaneous commitment; Numerical methods;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gerhard Sorger, 1996. "Markov Perfect Nash Equilibria in a Class of Resource Games," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-15, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Christopher Phelan & Ennio Stacchetti, 2001. "Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1491-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Cohen, Daniel & Michel, Philippe, 1988. "How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(2), pages 263-74, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Judd, Kenneth L., 1992. "Projection methods for solving aggregate growth models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 410-452, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Turnovsky, Stephen J. & Brock, William A., 1980. "Time consistency and optimal government policies in perfect foresight equilibrium," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 183-212, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Paul Klein & Per Krusell & José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 2004. "Time-Consistent Public Expenditures," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000652, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Krusell, Per & Smith Jr., Anthony A, 2001. "Consumption-Savings Decisions with Quasi-Geometric Discounting," CEPR Discussion Papers 2651, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Song, Zheng, 2008. "The Dynamics of Inequality and Social Security in General Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 10365, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All RePEc services are meant to be be free forever, as they are all run by volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.