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International aspects of pollution control

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Author Info

  • Frederick Ploeg
  • Aart Zeeuw

Abstract

Pollution is a by-product of production, is only gradually dissolved by the environment, and crosses national borders. The market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution. In practice, governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra-national social planning. Absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges, less cleaning-up activities and more pollution. Appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis. Attention is also paid to investment in clean technology. The debate between optimists, who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy, and pessimists can be analysed in this way. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00338239
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental & Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 2 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 117-139

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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:2:y:1992:i:2:p:117-139

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

Related research

Keywords: Pollution control; international policy games;

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References

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  1. Van Der Ploeg, F., 1987. "Inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 123-145, March.
  2. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
  3. Fershtman, Chaim, 1989. "Fixed rules and decision rules : Time consistency and subgame perfection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 191-194, September.
  4. Reynolds, Stanley S, 1987. "Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(1), pages 69-88, February.
  5. Henk Folmer & Charles Howe, 1991. "Environmental problems and policy in the Single European Market," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 1(1), pages 17-41, March.
  6. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Stokey, Nancy L, 1985. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 161-73, February.
  7. van der Ploeg, F & de Zeeuw, A J, 1990. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Competitive Arms Accumulation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 131-46, February.
  8. Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I, 1987. "Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1151-64, September.
  9. Ploeg, F. van der & Withagen, C.A.A.M., 1991. "Pollution control and the Ramsey problem," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3107039, Tilburg University.
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  1. > Environmental and Natural Resource Economics > Climate economics > International agreements
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