Fixed rules and decision rules : Time consistency and subgame perfection
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 30 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Fershtman, C., 1988. "Fixed Rules And Decision Rules: Time Consistency And Subgame Perfection," Papers 12-88, Tel Aviv.
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