Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core
AbstractWe study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced (understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that are never reached are ignored.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2009.83.
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Partition Function; Externalities; Implementation; Recursive Core; Stationary Perfect Equilibrium; Time Consistent Equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- László Á. Kóczy, 2009. "Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core," Working Paper Series 0905, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- Laszlo A. Koczy, 2012. "Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1226, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2012. "Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core," Working Paper Series 1203, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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