Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Chen-Ying Huang

    (Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, 21 Hsu-Chow Road, Taipei, Taiwan)

  • Tomas Sjöström

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08901, USA)

Abstract

We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the α-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any restrictions, such as stationarity, on strategies.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/2/66/pdf
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/2/66/
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MDPI, Open Access Journal in its journal Games.

Volume (Year): 1 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 66-88

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:2:p:66-88:d:7953

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mdpi.com/

Related research

Keywords: coalition formation; non-cooperative implementation; partition function; recursive core;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. László Á. Kóczy, 2012. "Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core," Working Paper Series 1203, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  2. László Á. Kóczy & Péter Biró & Balázs Sziklai, 2012. "Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary?," Working Paper Series 1204, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:2:p:66-88:d:7953. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (XML Conversion Team).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.