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The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games

Author

Listed:
  • Chen-Ying Huang

    (Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, 21 Hsu-Chow Road, Taipei, Taiwan)

  • Tomas Sjöström

    (Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08901, USA)

Abstract

We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the α-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any restrictions, such as stationarity, on strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen-Ying Huang & Tomas Sjöström, 2010. "The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 1(2), pages 1-23, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:2:p:66-88:d:7953
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kóczy, LászlóÁ., 2015. "Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 104-110.
    2. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, March.
    3. Yang, Guangjing & Sun, Hao, 2023. "The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    4. Laszlo A. Koczy, 2019. "The risk-based core for cooperative games with uncertainty," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1906, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    5. László Á. Kóczy & Péter Biró & Balázs Sziklai, 2012. "Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary?," Working Paper Series 1204, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.

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