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A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations

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Author Info
Kalai, Ehud
Postlewaite, Andrew
Roberts, John

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYH522-7M/2/fd2402598709d5b6050d6d41581f318b
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 20 (1979)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 13-22
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:20:y:1979:i:1:p:13-22

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Vind, Karl, 1972. "A Third Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 585-86, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Schmeidler, David, 1972. "A Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 579-80, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dreze, Jacques H & de la Vallee Poussin, D, 1971. "A Tatonnement Process for Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 133-50, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1979. "On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 140-165, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ehud Kalai & John Roberts, 1977. "A Simple Game of Exchange," Discussion Papers 280, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ehud Kalai, 1977. "A Game of Barter with Barriers to Trade," Discussion Papers 302, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hurwicz, L, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 217-25, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Chen Ying Huang & Tomas Sjostrom, 2005. "Implementation of the Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games," Economics Working Papers 0052, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities," ISER Discussion Paper 0651, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Brennan Platt, 2009. "Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 361-381, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Tone Dieckmann & Ulrich Schwalbe, 2000. "Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1878, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  6. Shlomo Weber & Hans Wiesmeth, 1990. "On the theory of cost sharing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 71-82, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Tone Dieckmann; & Ulrich Schwalbe, 1998. "Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Core," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n810798, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth. [Downloadable!]
  8. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "On the Equivalence of G-weak and -strong Cores in the Marriage Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0652, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jul 2006. [Downloadable!]
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