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Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

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Author Info
László Á. Kóczy () (Keleti Faculty of Economics, Budapest Tech and Department of Economics, Maastricht University)

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Abstract

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, GEB, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced (understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that are never reached are ignored.

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File URL: http://bmf.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/wpaper/0905.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Manuscript, 2009
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 0905.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0905

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Related research
Keywords: partition function; externalities; implementation; recursive core; stationary perfect equilibrium; time consistent equi- librium;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Eyckmans, Johan & Tulkens, Henry, 2003. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 299-327, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kyle Hyndman & Debraj Ray, 2007. "Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(4), pages 1125-1147, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kóczy, László Á., 2009. "Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 559-565, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2003. "Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 196-213, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.

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