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Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games

Author

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  • Francis Bloch

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Anne van den Nouweland

    (University of Oregon [Eugene])

Abstract

This paper proposes axiomatic foundations of expectation formation rules, by which deviating players anticipate the reaction of external players in a partition function game. The projection rule is the only rule satisfying subset consistency and responsiveness to the original partition of non-deviating players. It is also the only rule satisfying subset consistency, independence of the original partition of deviating players, and coherence of expectations. Exogenous rules are the only rules satisfying subset consistency and independence of the original partition, and the pessimistic rule is the only rule generating superadditive coalitional games.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis Bloch & Anne van den Nouweland, 2014. "Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01162227, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01162227
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    partition function games; core; expectation formation; axiomatization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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