Bargaining without commitment
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 2 (1990)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2012.
"Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core,"
Working Paper Series
1203, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2009. "Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core," Working Papers 2009.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Laszlo A. Koczy, 2012. "Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1226, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2009. "Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core," Working Paper Series 0905, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- Américo M. S. Carvalho Mendes, 2007.
"A Game Theoretical Model of Land Contract Choice,"
Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers)
01, Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto).
- Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007.
"Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?,"
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
- Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Working Papers 04-21, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse7_2006, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Binmore, Ken & Piccione, Michele & Samuelson, Larry, 1998. "Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 257-291, June.
- Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2010.
"Firm Size And Pricing Policy,"
Bulletin of Economic Research,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 181-195, 04.
- Cripps, Martin W., 1998. "Markov bargaining games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 341-355, March.
- László Á. Kóczy & Péter Biró & Balázs Sziklai, 2012. "Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary?," Working Paper Series 1204, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.