Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
AbstractWe introduce the game in cover function form, which is a bargaining game of sequential offers for endogenous overlapping coalitions. This extension of games in partition function form removes the restriction to disjoint coalitions. We discuss the existence of equilibria, and we develop an algorithm to compute equilibrium outcomes, under some conditions. We define the key properties that overlapping coalition structures must verify to uniquely identify networks. We show that each network is defined as an equilibrium outcome of a game in cover function form. Our results bridge the two strands of literature devoted to the formation networks and coalitions.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 14-02.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2014
Date of revision:
Overlapping coalitions; Bargaining; Network formation; Coalition formation; Game in cover function form; Symmetric game;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-04-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-04-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GER-2014-04-11 (German Papers)
- NEP-GTH-2014-04-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2014-04-11 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2014-04-11 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marcel Fafchamps & Susan Lund, .
"Risk Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines,"
97014, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
- Ray, Debraj, 2007. "A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199207954, October.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004.
"The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 426-454, June.
- Matt Jackson, 2003. "The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000032, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee, 2006. "Coalition Theory and its Applications: A Survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(509), pages F136-F155, 02.
- Binmore, K & Shaked, A & Sutton, J, 1985. "Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1178-80, December.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003.
"A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency,"
1161, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 0303011, EconWPA.
- Ambec, Stefan & Treich, Nicolas, 2007. "Roscas as financial agreements to cope with self-control problems," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 120-137, January.
- Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999.
"A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers 98-1, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
- Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 68, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 0068, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September.
- Taiji Furusawa & Hideo Konishi, 2002.
"Free Trade Networks,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
548, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 08 Sep 2003.
- Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2007. "Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 339-356, July.
- Albizuri, M.J. & Aurrecoechea, J. & Zarzuelo, J.M., 2006. "Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-17, October.
- Bolger, E M, 1989. "A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 37-44.
- Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April.
- Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luc Savard).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.