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Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games

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Huang, Chen-Ying
Sjostrom, Tomas

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 42 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 (September)
Pages: 771-793
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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:42:y:2006:i:6:p:771-793

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  1. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Tadenuma, K, 1992. "Reduced Games, Consistency, and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 325-34.
  3. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
  5. Ehud Kalai, 1978. "A Group Incentive Compatible Mechanism Yielding Core Allocation," Discussion Papers 329, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Moldovanu, Benny & Winter, Eyal, 1994. "Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 533-548, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 185-87.
  8. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Moldovanu Benny & Winter Eyal, 1995. "Order Independent Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 21-34, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Francis Bloch, 1995. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 537-556, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. László Á. Kóczy, 2006. "Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities," Working Paper Series 0801, Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics, revised Apr 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Kóczy, László Á., 2008. "Stationary quasi-perfect equilibrium partitions constitute the recursive core," Research Memoranda 028, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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